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American Economic Policy in the 1980s: Policies 
Affecting the Aged 
The increasing proportion of older people in the United States and increasing 
life expectancy have given particular importance to the public policies that 
affect older Americans. Indeed, policies affecting the aged have been a major 
component of federal legislation throughout the 1980s. This paper considers 
aging legislation in the 1980s from an economic perspective, evaluating the 
motivations for legislative developments and the economic implications of the 
legislation enacted. A central goal is to relate the economic perspective on 
aging issues to the objectives and motivations expressed by policymakers in 
considering and enacting new legislation. 
The discussion is organized around three major issues: (1) retirement and 
retirement income programs, including Social Security and private pension 
plans; (2)  individual saving for retirement and the tax-incentive programs that 
encourage savings, such as Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans, and 
401(k) plans; and (3) the increasing cost of health care and the public programs 
The authors benefited from comments by Victor Fuchs and Martin Feldstein on earlier drafts of 
the paper and from discussions, some quite extensive, with Lawrence Atkins, Robert Ball, Nathalie 
Cannon, Gary Christopherson, John Cogan, Elaine Fultz, Elma Henderson, Joseph Humphreys, 
David Koitz, Brian Lutz, Manuel Miranda, Don Muse, Judy Schuub, Theodore Totman, Christine 
Williams, and Karen Worth-all  of whom were involved in the process of evaluating and devel- 
oping aging legislation in the 1980s. 
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that reimburse health care expenses (particularly Medicare). Some significant 
federal policy changes were enacted in each of these areas in the 1980s,  includ- 
ing Social Security reform (1983), new private pension plan regulations (vari- 
ous years), prohibition of mandatory retirement (1986), IRA restrictions (1981, 
1986), Medicare reimbursement procedures (1983, 1989), and catastrophic 
medical insurance (1988, 1989). 
The discussion of each issue begins with a description of the economic con- 
text in which the policy decisions are made. The changing age demographics 
of the U.S. population are particularly important since, even without the enact- 
ment of  new  legislation, they have  an enormous effect on the cost and the 
effects of  government programs. Other economic trends are important to the 
discussion of specific aging issues-such  as younger retirement, low rates of 
personal saving, and high inflation for health care services. 
Having developed an economic context for each issue, the legislation im- 
pinging on the issue and the motivation for the legislation is then reviewed. 
Finally, the motivation for the legislation (as expressed by  policymakers) is 
contrasted with the economic description of the problem. For example, given 
the existing trend toward younger retirement in the United States, does Social 
Security legislation in the 1980s aggravate or moderate this trend? An attempt 
is made to judge the key factors that molded the final legislation and to contrast 
those factors with those reflected in economic analysis. 
Several themes, none of  which are new  in this discussion, are important 
across legislation in all the areas. First, the budget deficit was an overriding 
concern throughout much of  the 1980s, and this concern placed an important 
constraint not only on the legislation that was passed but also on the legislation 
that was considered. Second, who benefits and who loses is typically a more 
critical determinant of policy choice than the economist’s “efficiency.” Third, 
fairness and protection of rights have taken precedence over incentive effects 
of policies or the economic efficiency of the policies. 
12.1  Retirement and  Retirement Income 
12.1.1  The Economic Issue 
The American population is aging rapidly, and individuals are living longer, 
yet older Americans are leaving the labor force at younger and younger ages. 
Earlier departure from the labor force may have been made possible by  and 
may be attributed to the introduction of Social Security and firm pension plans. 
These programs can lead to younger retirement for two reasons. First, these 
programs provide a means of  support during retirement so that people can 
afford to retire. Of  course, the major reason for retirement programs is to do 
just this. Second and more worrisome, the benefit structure of these programs 
includes financial incentives that encourage retirement and penalize work. Nei- 
ther Social Security nor firm pension plans have been neutral with respect to 743  Policy toward the Aged 
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the age at which individuals  decide to retire. Rather, their provisions encourage 
early retirement and penalize continuing participation in the labor force. 
According to a recent study, the labor force participation rates of men over 
sixty were essentially constant between 1870 and 1930 and then declined con- 
tinuously thereafter (see Ransom and Sutch 1988). The data on labor force 
participation, based on the decennial censuses, are reproduced in figure 12.1. 
These census data also have been used to construct labor force participation 
rates by age group for men and women at ten year intervals, beginning in 1940 
(see Sandefur and Tuma 1987). The rates for men fell in each age group. For 
example, 61.4 percent of men aged fifty-five and over were in the labor force 
in 1940; by  1970, the proportion had fallen to 52.7 percent; and, by  1990, only 
39.4 percent of men in this age group were in the labor force. The participation 
rates of women aged fifty-five and over increased until 1970. Since 1970, how- 
ever, even the participation rates for older women have fallen. 
The decrease in  labor force participation rates after 1930 roughly corre- 
sponds to the implementation of  the Social Security program and federal tax 
incentives for private pension plans. Social Security was introduced under the 
Social Security Act of  1935. Company pensions were spurred by the Revenue 
Act of  1942, which granted tax incentives to firms to establish pension plans. 
The correlation between the introduction of these retirement policies and the 
change in labor force participation at older ages suggests that the policies may 
have induced younger retirement. Many researchers have pointed to the Social 
Security system's high benefit levels and work disincentives as a major contrib- 
utor to the continuing trend toward early retirement, and a great deal of  re- 
search has focused on the effect of Social Security on labor force participation. 
More recent research has identified similar but more pronounced work disin- 
centives in most private pension plans. The discussion below explains the in- 
centive effects inherent in the provisions of  public and private plans, indepen- 
dent of the retirement wealth that they represent. 744  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
Social Security-Zncentives 
Social Security benefits are based on past individual earnings, although the 
benefit levels are a much larger proportion of the past earnings of  low-wage 
workers than of high-wage workers.' The easiest way to understand the incen- 
tive effects of  the benefit structure is to consider the compensation value of 
the Social Security program at different ages. The compensation value of the 
program is the incremental change in the present value of  all future Social 
Security benefits that results from continued work-referred  to as Social Secu- 
rity accrual. Work and retirement incentives are caused by the changes in So- 
cial Security accrual occurring at particular ages. 
To exemplify these incentives, nominal wages by  age and nominal Social 
Security accrual by age are shown in figure 12.2 for two representative work- 
ers, one a low-wage and the other a high-wage employee. Thus, the figure 
represents two forms of compensation: fig.12.2~  nominal earnings by age and 
fig. 12.2b the increase in the entitlement to future Social Security benefits by 
age. Figure 12.2~  shows Social Security accrual as a percentage of earnings. 
As shown, Social Security accrual is a small proportion of wage earnings for 
the high-wage worker but can be a significant proportion for the low-wage 
worker. 
For the low-wage worker, Social Security accrual is about 6 percent of wage 
earnings at age fifty and increases to almost 10 percent at age sixty-two. How- 
ever, if the low-wage worker continues to work from age sixty-two to age sixty- 
five, Social Security accrual becomes negative-negative  10 percent of  the 
wage at age sixty-four, for example. The loss in the present value of future 
Social Security benefits is about 39 percent of  wage earnings if  the person 
continues to work after age sixty-five. This large reduction in the compensation 
value of  the Social Security program at older ages encourages retirement at 
older ages. A similar (although less pronounced) pattern is apparent for the 
high-wage worker. 
Firm Pensions-Incentives 
Roughly three-quarters of all persons participating in private pension plans 
are enrolled in defined benefit plans where benefits are determined according 
1, The initial benefit is based on nominal earnings indexed at age-sixty dollars using the Con- 
sumer Price Index (CPI). After retirement (receipt of benefits), the benefits are indexed to the CPI. 
The normal Social Security retirement age is sixty-five. But benefits can be taken as young as 
sixty-two, with the benefit amount actuarially reduced to reflect the increase in the expected num- 
ber of retirement years over which benefits will be received. That is, if the benefit entitlement is 
not changed because of a change in earnings, the expected present value of  future benefits is the 
same irrespective of the age, between sixty-two and sixty-five, at which the benefits are first re- 
ceived. After age sixty-five, however, the increase in the benefits is much less than actuarial. It is 
now 3 percent per year but was only  1 percent per year until 1981. Although the change from 1 
percent to 3 percent was the result of a 1977 law, it applied to those who would be sixty-five in 
1981 and later years. 745  Policy toward the Aged 
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workers; (b)  Social Security accrual, representative of low- and high-wage 
workers; (c) Real Social Security accrual as a percentage of real earnings, low- 
and high-wage workers 
(a)  Employment earnings, representative  low- and high-wage 746  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
to a specified formula. The remainder are enrolled in plans where benefits are 
directly related to contributions made on behalf of  the employee and to the 
performance of the plan’s investment portfolio. Because most workers are cov- 
ered by defined benefit plans, and because they are likely to have the greatest 
effects on labor market behavior, the discussion here emphasizes the incentive 
effects of this type of plan. 
The incentive effects of  defined benefit pension plans can be expressed in 
the same way as the incentive effects of Social Security-through  the accrual 
of future pension benefits. The compensation value of a firm pension plan is 
the incremental change (or accrual) in the present value of all future pension 
benefits that results from continued work. Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987) 
evaluated the retirement incentives inherent in a large number of firm plans. 
Figure 12.3 (taken from Kotlikoff and Wise [1987]) shows the average accrual 
rates (weighted by plan membership) for U.S. defined benefit plans with se- 
lected early and normal retirement ages. Pension accrual is represented as a 
percentage of wage compensation.2 
Work and retirement incentives result from changes in the compensation 
value of the plans at particular ages. For example, consider the plans with early 
and normal retirement at age fifty-five, a plan stipulation that is common in the 
transportation industry. For these plans, the average decline in the rate of pen- 
sion accrual at age fifty-five is equivalent to about 30 percent of wage earnings. 
The average decline in pension accrual at age sixty-five is equivalent to another 
20 percent of wage earnings. This sharp decline in the compensation value of 
these plans creates a substantial retirement incentive. 
A similar decrease in compensation value at older ages occurs in plans with 
different early and normal retirement ages. The more common plans with early 
retirement at age fifty-five and normal retirement at age sixty-five, for example, 
exhibit an increase in pension wealth accrual to age fifty-five, with a decline 
thereafter. Again, continued work past age sixty-five is associated with a sub- 
stantial decrease in pension accrual-equivalent,  on average, to approximately 
20 percent of wage earnings. Thus, on the basis of industry-wide earnings pro- 
files, continued employment with the plan sponsor after the age of early retire- 
ment and, in particular, after the age of normal retirement typically involves a 
substantial reduction in total annual compensation because of declines in pen- 
sion wealth accrual. 
Retirement Policies-Effects 
Whether incentive effects like those described above have an effect on retire- 
ment decisions may be illustrated by considering the relation between pension 
2. The data come from a random sample of approximately 2,500 plans from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Level of Benefits Survey. Similar calculations have been made by Lazear (1983) on the 
basis of the Bankers Trust Survey of large pension plans. For each plan, accrual rates are calculated 
assuming average wage-tenure profiles in the industry and occupation to which the plan pertains, 
based on current population survey data (see Kotlikoff and Wise 1985). 747  Policy toward the Aged 
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and normal retirement ages 
plan provisions, Social Security provisions, and retirement in a firm. Kotlikoff 
and Wise (1989) have done that for a large Fortune 500 firm, showing a very 
strong relation between the economic incentives in the retirement policies and 
departure rates from the firm. 
The proportion of  the firm’s employees who leave at each age beginning 
with age fifty is shown in table 12.1. The yearly departure rate (shown in the 
middle column) is the proportion of those employed at the beginning of  the 
year that retires-more  strictly speaking, leaves the firm-during  the forth- 
coming year. About 3 percent of employees between ages fifty and fifty-four 
leave each year. The departure rate jumps to about 11 percent at age fifty-five. 
There is another jump at age sixty and again at ages sixty-two and sixty-five. 
The last column of the table (“cumulative departures”) shows the proportion 
of employees working at fifty who remain at later subsequent ages. For exam- 
ple, only 21 percent remain until age sixty-two, only 5 percent until sixty-five. 
The jumps in departure rates (at ages fifty-five, sixty, sixty-two, and sixty- 
five) coincide with the economic incentives in the firm’s pension plan and in 
the Social Security program. Figure 12.4 shows wage earnings by age, pension 
accrual by  age, and Social Security by  age for a representative employee at 
the coiripany. The compensation value of the plans changes discontinuously at 
certam specific ages. The discontinuities in compensation correspond directly 
with the jumps in departure rates from the firm. 
The discontinuities are as follows. (1) By working until age fifty-five, the 
worker becomes eligible for early retirement benefits. Thus, there is a very 
large pension accrual at age fifty-five (shown as a large spike in the graph). 
This leads to a large increase in retirement at age fifty-fi~e.~  (2) Employees 
3. To  understand the potential importance of the early retirement benefits, suppose that, if it 
were not for this inducement, the departure rates would remain at 3 percent until age sixty instead 
of the  11 or 12 percent rates that are observed. Departure at 3 percent per year means that  14 748  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
Table 12.1  Yearly and Cumulative Departure Rates by age, for Employees with 
11 or More Years of Service 1980 
Age  Yearly Departure  Cumulative Departure 
50  3  91 
51  3  94 
52  5  89 
53  4  85 
54  3  83 
55  11 
56  12 
51  9 
58  10 
59  I1 
60  17 
61  17 
62  36 
63  31 











65  53  5 
with thirty or more years of  service can receive “full” unreduced retirement 
benefits at age sixty. The same “full” benefit formula is used for retirement in 
every year after age sixty. For these employees, there is a sharp decrease in 
the compensation value of the pension plan between ages sixty and sixty-one, 
equivalent to a wage cut of  about 14 percent. Again, there is an increase in 
departure rates at age sixty, corresponding to this decrease in pension accrual. 
(3)  Although there is no discontinuity in the compensation value of retirement 
programs at age sixty-two, workers first become eligible for Social Security 
benefits at age sixty-two, and this eligibility appears to induce a jump in retire- 
ment rates. (4) Social Security accruals increase up to age sixty-five (the nor- 
mal retirement age) but fall sharply thereafter. After age sixty-five, Social Se- 
curity accrual becomes negative, equivalent to about -$8,500  at age sixty-six. 
In  summary, possibly  the  most  important economic trend  among  older 
Americans has been the dramatic reduction in their labor force participation. 
The trend toward earlier retirement is especially striking when viewed in the 
light of increasing life expectancy and the increasing proportion of the popula- 
tion that is old. The prospect is for a declining proportion of working people 
supporting an increasing proportion of retirees. In addition to this economic 
squeeze, economic analysis reveals that public and private pension provisions 
have themselves contributed to the decline in labor force participation. It seems 
apparent that the retirement income provided by  Social Security and private 
percent of those who were employed at fifty-five would have left before age sixty; at  1  I percent 
per year, 44 percent would leave between fifty-five and fifty-nine. 749  Policy toward the Aged 
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pensions has allowed older workers to leave the labor force at younger and 
younger ages and still support themselves after retirement. Indeed, a principal 
intent of pensions is to allow just this. But Social Security and private pension 
provisions do not just provide for post-retirement income in a neutral fashion; 
they provide strong incentives to remain in the labor force until some age and 
then typically provide strong incentive to leave at some later age, often as 
young as fifty-five. Put another way, they penalize work by older employees. 
Reversing the trend toward early retirement represents an important alterna- 
tive for addressing the demographic transition. Additional labor supply of the 
elderly would relieve Social Security's finances as well as offset a potential 
shortage in the supply of  labor relative to that of other productive factors. In 
addition, it is argued that, for many elderly people, prolonging their labor force 
participation would mean more fulfilling lives. 
12.1.2  The Legislation 
The most important retirement policy legislation in the 1980s pertains to 
Social Security reform and to the regulation of private pension plans. Although 750  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
the discussion of the economic context emphasizes declining labor force par- 
ticipation and Social Security and private pension plan incentives to leave the 
labor force, the legislation in this area was motivated in large part by  other 
concerns. In particular, the early retirement incentives inherent in Social Secu- 
rity and firm pension plan provisions were not the driving force for legislative 
change, although the legislation that resulted may be expected to have implica- 
tions for retirement. Rather, the legislation was motivated first by the financial 
position of the Social Security system and second by a concern for protecting 
private pension benefits of workers covered by firm pension plans. 
Social Security Legislation 
Legislation enacted in 1983 made several major changes in the Social Secu- 
rity program. The fundamental motivation for the Social Security Act Amend- 
ments of  1983 was the pending bankruptcy of the Old Age and Survivor’s In- 
surance (OASI) trust fund that supports the Social Security ~rogram.~  Most of 
the debate on the legislation dealt with the mix of  taxes versus benefit reduc- 
tions and with how the burden of restoring the system to financial health should 
be distributed, rather than the work and retirement incentives of  the Social 
Security program or the economic efficiency of the program. The legislation 
did, however, have potentially important implications  for the labor force partic- 
ipation of older workers. 
Congress had attempted to address the financial shortage in the Social Secu- 
rity program in 1977 by  raising payroll tax rates. By 1980, however, because 
of  lower than expected economic growth, it became apparent that the OASI 
trust fund would still face bankruptcy without additional reforms. Congres- 
sional consideration of  Social Security reform began in  1981, although the 
final reform package was not enacted until the spring of  1983. 
The positive spirit for reform that opened the 1981 legislative session ended 
abruptly with the introduction of  a reform proposal from the administration. 
The two most controversial provisions of the administration proposal were to 
reduce the benefits of those retiring early from 80 percent of the normal (age 
sixty-five) benefit to 55 percent of  the normal (age sixty-five) benefit and to 
impose a three-month delay in the annual cost-of-living adjustment. Congres- 
sional Democrats quickly framed the proposal as an effort by the administra- 
tion to cut the Social Security program rather than to restore its financial 
health. Members of both parties expressed their opposition to at least parts of 
the administration  proposal, and congressional  Democrats vowed to prevent its 
enactment. Although the administration  quickly stepped back from the details 
of  the proposal, the momentum for Social Security reform within Congress 
was severely deterred. 
This set the stage for the appointment of  a fifteen-member bipartisan com- 
mission (known as the Greenspan Commission) to study the problem and to 
4.  The potential insolvency of  the Social Security system is discussed in the paper by Jim Po- 
terba in this volume. 751  Policy toward the Aged 
submit a report by  the end of  1982. The Social Security reform legislation 
enacted early in 1983 closely followed the recommendations of the Greenspan 
Commission. The key to the commission’s success was in finding a compro- 
mise that could be accepted by the administration and by congressional leaders 
from both parties before being presented to the more politically charged legis- 
lative forum. 
Many of the provisions of the legislation were closely related to the financial 
solvency of the system: either raising revenues or decreasing benefits. For ex- 
ample, the legislation delayed the cost-of-living adjustment in Social Security 
benefits by  six months. The dates for previously scheduled payroll tax  in- 
creases were advanced, gradually raising the rates (including both the em- 
ployer and the employee contributions) from  13.4 percent to  15.02 percent. 
And up to 50 percent of Social Security benefits became taxable for higher- 
income individuals and  couple^.^ 
A number of other provisions potentially influence labor force participation 
among older workers. First, the rate of adjustment in Social Security benefits 
for delaying retirement after the normal retirement age will increase gradually 
from 3 percent per year of  delayed retirement to 8 percent per year. On  the 
basis of  the economic incentives inherent in this change, one would expect 
more people to choose retirement at older ages. Once the new law is fully 
phased in (in 2008), the benefit that a person loses from postponing retirement 
for one year will be roughly offset by larger benefits over the years that they 
will be received. Thus, there should be no incentive to take the benefits at age 
sixty-five to avoid a loss in the present value of the benefits that will be received 
ultimately, as there is under the current 3 percent adjustment. 
In  describing the purpose of  this provision, the House Ways  and Means 
Committee explicitly stated its intent to encourage older workers to defer re- 
tirement. According to their report on the bill, “Your Committee continues to 
believe that it is desirable to provide incentives for individuals to remain in 
employment beyond normal retirement age. . . .  This [legislation] will dramati- 
cally increase the amount by which the combined effects of  (1) the reduction 
factors before age 65, (2) use of earnings after age 61 in the benefit computa- 
tion and (3) the delayed retirement credit can result in higher benefits for work- 
ers who delay retirement.” 
A second part of the legislation that is likely to affect labor force participa- 
tion is the change in the normal retirement age and in the amount of retirement 
benefits provided to those retiring before the normal retirement age. The age 
of  eligibility for normal retirement benefits is to increase gradually from age 
sixty-five to age sixty-seven over the period from 2003 to 2027. Retirees will 
continue to be eligible for reduced Social Security benefits at age sixty-two, 
5. The tax was imposed on individuals whose income (including half their Social Security bene- 
fits) exceeds $25,000 and married couples whose income (including half their Social Security 
benefits) exceeds $32,000. 752  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
but their early retirement benefits will be 70 percent of  the normal benefit, 
rather than 80 percent as under previous law. Overall, the amount of the benefit 
for retiring at any age before age sixty-seven will be lower than the amount of 
the benefit that would have been received prior to the legislation. 
The increase in the normal retirement age and the reduction in the amount 
of benefits received at each age before the normal retirement age will also tend 
to prolong labor force participation, especially among workers not covered by 
a firm pension plan. The strongest evidence for this expectation is the concen- 
tration  of  retirement  at the current  Social Security normal retirement  age 
among persons who have not retired before then. In part, this concentration is 
probably due to a psychological incentive to retire at the “normal” retirement 
age that has nothing to do with economic incentives. But it must also be due 
to the economic incentives associated with the current benefit computation for- 
mulas. 
A third provision of the legislation that is likely to affect labor force partici- 
pation relates to the “earnings test.” Prior to the 1983 legislation, Social Secu- 
rity beneficiaries under age seventy lost $1.00 in benefits for every $2.00 in 
earned income above the earnings limit (then $6,600). Beginning in  1990, 
these Social Security recipients lost $1.00 in benefits for every $3.00 in earned 
income above the limit (currently about $10,560). The apparent reason for this 
change was to reduce the perceived penalty6 for work after retirement and thus 
to encourage labor force participation. Reducing the penalty for earned income 
also had the political advantage of giving something back to higher-income 
Social Security beneficiaries, who would now be subject to a tax on part of 
their Social Security income. 
While the need to restore the Social Security system to financial solvency 
served as the primary catalyst for Social Security reform, economic analysis 
of the retirement incentives inherent in Social Security provisions seems to 
have had a significant impact on the composition of that reform. Some of the 
most important changes in the Social Security program were not cost saving 
but were implemented for other economic reasons. Social Security benefits for 
those with earned income above the specified earnings limit were increased, 
not decreased, as were the benefits for individuals choosing to delay retirement 
after the normal retirement age. 
Economic analysis of  Social Security has emphasized the work and retire- 
ment incentives associated with these provisions and thus may have been criti- 
cal in informing Social Security reform in these areas. Economic analysis has 
tended to show, for example, that the earnings test discourages work among 
Social Security benefit recipients. The 1983 reform of the earnings test reduces 
6. Although  the tax on earnings above the limit tends to discourage work, the earnings are 
incorporated in the calculation of subsequent benefits. The increase in later benefits may approxi- 
mately offset the large earnings tax, but the adjustment in later benefits is probably not understood 
or appreciated by the typical beneficiary or is too far removed from the present to matter. There 
has been a large concentration of earnings just at the limit, suggesting that, were it not for the tax, 
many persons would work more. 753  Policy toward the Aged 
the magnitude of this work disincentive. Similarly, economic analysis tends to 
show that the small (3 percent per year) increase in Social Security benefits for 
delaying retirement beyond the normal retirement age encourages retirement 
at the normal retirement age of  sixty-five. Again, the change in the benefit 
computation formula enacted in 1983 reduces the magnitude of this retirement 
incentive. A financial crisis provided the initiative for reform, but more com- 
prehensive reform, not just financial restoration, was an important part of the 
legislative outcome. 
Further revisions of the earnings test continue to be considered in Congress, 
with the primary motivation of reducing the work disincentive among Social 
Security recipients. According to Senator Bentsen, who introduced one bill 
easing the earnings test in 1989, “We can’t afford to keep healthy and vigorous 
older Americans out of the work force. It’s like keeping your best hitters on the 
bench.” Legislation raising the earnings limit came very close to enactment in 
1989. The House of Representatives approved a plan to raise the earnings limit 
to $9,720 in 1990 and to about $10,440 in 1991. The Senate Finance Commit- 
tee approved a different plan, raising the earnings limit to about $11,700 in 
1990 and about $14,500 in  1991. The Senate version would also have de- 
creased the reduction in Social Security benefits to $1.00 for every $4.00 in 
earned income above the limit for the first $5,000 of earned income above the 
limit. The House earnings test provisions became part of the fiscal 1990  budget 
reconciliation bill. At the end of the 1989 session, almost all provisions of the 
budget  reconciliation  that  did  not  reduce  the  deficit  were  categorically 
dr~pped.~  Proposals to ease the earnings test are again being evaluated at the 
current time. 
Regulation oj  Firm Pension Plans 
The economic description of firm plans given above emphasizes their early 
retirement incentives. Most recent pension legislation, however, is directed 
toward plan “fairness” and toward the protection of “promised” benefits. 
ERISA. To  put the 1980s legislation in context, it is necessary to review the 
1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which protects the 
pension benefits of most employees covered by private pension plans and con- 
tinues to be the primary tool for government regulation of firm pension plans 
today. The ERISA legislation established minimum funding standards for pen- 
sion plans and created the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), a 
federal agency responsible for insuring pension plans. Employers with defined 
benefit pension plans were required to pay a premium of $1  .OO per worker to 
the PBGC for pension insurance. Both the creation of the PBGC and the pen- 
7. Many bills were introduced in Congress that related to the earnings test. A bill to repeal the 
earnings test had two sponsors and 130 cosponsors. The bill that eventually passed the House was 
introduced by  the chairman of  the House Ways and Mean Subcommittee on Social Security. On 
the Senate side, there were several strong advocates for easing the earnings test. Legislation was 
introduced by the Finance Committee chairman and the Social Security Subcommittee chairman. 754  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
sion funding requirements were designed to assure that workers expecting pen- 
sions would not lose these expected benefits if  the company experienced fi- 
nancial difficulties. 
Congress was also concerned that companies were able to back out of their 
pension obligation when workers terminated their employment (either volunta- 
rily or involuntarily) just before their retirement. An important characteristic 
of  most defined benefit pension plans is the concentration in the accrual of 
pension benefit entitlements late in the working life, often referred to as “back- 
loading.”  Since most of  the value of  pension plans accrues to workers ap- 
proaching retirement age, companies can at least theoretically terminate work- 
ers just  before  taking  on  these  large pension  liabilities. Because  pension 
backloading imposes the risk that workers will lose most of their pension bene- 
fits, limiting the backloading of pension benefit accrual was an important ob- 
jective of  ERISA as well as of  subsequent legislation. Senator Bentsen ex- 
pressed this concern in introducing ERISA to Congress: “There are instances 
where  workers  have  not  received  pension  benefits  that  they  have  earned 
through years of long hard labor. Their dreams of financial security after retire- 
ment have been shattered.” 
To limit the extent of  pension backloading, ERISA stipulates that defined 
benefit pension accrual must satisfy one ofthree provisions. The first is a 3 
percent rule requiring that a worker’s accrued benefit must exceed his years of 
service times 3 percent of the normal retirement benefit he would have if he 
had begun service at the earliest possible age of participation and had remained 
with the firm until normal retirement. The second is a 133 percent rule requir- 
ing that future projected annual pension accrual not exceed 133 percent of 
current annual pension accrual. The third provision stipulates that the terminat- 
ing worker’s  benefit not be less than his projected normal retirement benefit 
times the ratio of  actual completed service to the service the worker would 
have if he had remained with the firm through early retirement. 
While these provisions were designed to limit pension backloading, they 
were largely unsuccessful in this intent. First, each of these anti-backloading 
rules specifies that the projection of future normal retirement benefits and fu- 
ture pension accrual be determined by  assuming that a worker’s future wage 
equals his current wage. Accounting for wage inflation, however, future wages 
are likely to be much greater than current wages, and thus the real value of 
current accrual may be quite low. Even with a very modest rate of wage infla- 
tion, a pension plan that is significantly backloaded will meet at least one of 
the three anti-backloading provisions. 
Second, pension plans are often backloaded through the early retirement 
provisions. The accrual rules specified by ERISA pertain to normal retirement 
benefits rather than early retirement benefits. Early retirement benefits that are 
larger than the actuarially fair adjustment of  normal retirement benefits are 
apparently not restricted by the three anti-backloading rules in ERISA. Thus, 
for example, a firm would be free to structure its plan to have small normal 755  Policy toward the Aged 
retirement benefits (which satisfy one of the three ERISA rules) but substantial 
early retirement benefits. In this case, the large early retirement benefits might 
be structured with the accrual concentrated in the years just before the early 
retirement age rather than just before the normal retirement age. Again, a pen- 
sion plan that is significantly backloaded at the early retirement age will meet 
at least one of ERISA’s  anti-backloading provisions, all of which apply to the 
benefit amounts at the normal retirement ago. 
As the illustrations presented above demonstrate, the legislation appears to 
have been largely unsuccessful in limiting pension backloading. Thus, the eco- 
nomic implications of pension backloading are applicable to almost all defined 
benefit pension plans today. Backloaded pension plans encourage workers to 
continue working until they receive the backloaded benefits, and then to retire, 
once those benefits have been received and the rate of pension accrual declines. 
Thus, backloading decreases job mobility prior to the early or normal retire- 
ment ages and then increases retirement after the early or normal retirement 
ages. 
The incentive effects of backloaded pension plans were not emphasized in 
the 1974 ERISA legislation. Congress was concerned about the risk associated 
with backloaded plans rather than the job mobility and retirement incentives 
associated with those plans. This may have been partly because the behavioral 
incentives of pension plans were not widely recognized at that time; only later 
did economic research direct attention to the potential importance of these in- 
centives for job mobility and retirement.* 
Legislation enacted in the 1980s. The emphasis of pension plan legislation in 
the 1980s was to promote “fairness” in the treatment of different workers, to 
protect the pension benefits of plan participants, and to prevent “abuses” of the 
tax advantages associated with pension plans. As in the 1974 consideration of 
ERISA, there was little emphasis in the  1980s on the work and retirement 
incentives inherent in the plans. In fact, very little of the pension legislation 
enacted in the  1980s is likely to have a significant effect on retirement be- 
havior. 
One exception may be a 1986 provision requiring that employers continue 
to provide service credit for their employees after the normal retirement age. 
Prior to 1986, companies could stop counting years of service, once their em- 
ployees reached the normal retirement age. Since the new law enables employ- 
ees to continue to accrue service credits, employees have more incentive to 
continue working until older ages. Despite the potential effect of this legisla- 
tion on labor force participation, retirement incentives were not the primary 
motivation for this legislation. Instead, Congress was  concerned about fair- 
8. Even today, most companies with pension plans do not fully understand the work and retire- 
ment incentives associated with their plans. Companies tend to design their plans primarily to meet 
income replacement objectives rather than to influence retirement behavior (see Woodbury 1990). 756  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
ness-allowing  older workers to accrue service credits in the same way  that 
younger workers accrue service credits. In addition, driven by the political in- 
fluence of organized labor, the legislation was intended to increase the retire- 
ment benefit levels of workers choosing to continue working at older ages. 
Many other pieces of legislation were enacted in the 1980s to promote fair- 
ness in pension coverage. In  1984, Congress enacted the Retirement Equity 
Act, designed to provide greater pension coverage for women. The legislation 
was promoted largely by  vice presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro. In a 
hearing on  the bill, Ferraro stated, “My proposed private pension reforms 
would require private pension systems to recognize the contribution women 
make to our economy and to take into account women’s  unique work pat- 
terns-patterns  which revolve around childbearing and other family responsi- 
bilities.” Prior to the legislation, many workers (particularly women) who left 
their jobs temporarily lost their credited years of service toward vesting and 
were required to accumulate a full ten years of service after returning to their 
jobs. The 1984 legislation lowered the age of  pension plan participation from 
age twenty-five to age twenty-one, permitted employees to leave a job (for up 
to five years) without losing the credited years of  service, and required that 
maternity or paternity leave not be counted as a break in service. The legisla- 
tion also required companies to provide survivorship benefits to the spouses of 
employees who died prior to retirement eligibilit~.~ 
In  1986, congressional concern about the loss in pension benefits for mobile 
workers inspired a change in pension vesting rules. The 1986 legislation re- 
quired that employees become fully vested in a company’s pension plan after 
five years of employment (rather than ten years) or that vesting be phased in 
(20 percent per year) during the third through the seventh years of employment. 
The intent of the legislation was to increase pension coverage for workers leav- 
ing jobs before meeting the prior vesting rules. Because of backloading, how- 
ever, the effect of  the legislation on pension loss due to job mobility will be 
slight. 
Also in  1986, Congress enacted several measures intended to reduce em- 
ployer discrimination among different groups of  employees. First, Congress 
imposed new regulations on the Social Security offset provisions used in many 
pension plans. Under the new law, benefit formulas that accounted for Social 
Security could not reduce an employee’s pension by  more than 50 percent. 
Second, Congress developed very detailed regulations that were designed to 
prevent discrimination in the provision of employee benefits. In general, the 
new rules (“Section 89”) prohibited the provision of special employee benefits 
for highly compensated employees, unless those benefits were also provided 
to  lower-compensated employees. Because companies expressed enormous 
9. Prior to the legislation, companies were not obligated to provide survivorship benefits to the 
spouses of workers who died before becoming eligible for retirement. The 1984 legislation re- 
quired companies to provide survivorship benefits to the spouses of all vested workers, regardless 
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dissatisfaction with the complexity of the “Section 89” rules, the rules were 
initially postponed and eventually were repealed in 1989.’O 
Also to protect pension benefits, Congress enacted several laws regulating 
the funding of pension plans and assuring the financial solvency of the PBGC. 
The financial condition of  the PBGC was a concern throughout the  1980s, 
particularly after the bankruptcy of  several large corporations.” The PBGC 
insurance premium was increased from $1  .OO per worker to $2.60 per worker 
in 1977, to $8.50 per worker in  1986, and to $16.00 per worker in 1987. In 
1987, a  supplemental premium  was  also imposed on  companies with  un- 
derfunded plans. The supplemental premium was $6.00 per participant for ev- 
ery $1,000 of underfunding per participant (up to a maximum of  $34.00). New 
pension funding requirements were enacted in 1987, setting specific pensions 
contribution rules for companies with underfunded pension plans. The intent 
of this legislation was to build up underfunded pension plans to full funding 
expeditiously, thereby reducing the potential risk of the PBGC.I2 
Finally, pension legislation in the 1980s was used to limit several perceived 
abuses in the tax advantages of pension programs. For example, legislation 
enacted in 1987 prohibited tax-deductible contributions to pension funds with 
assets exceeding 150 percent of current obligations. The intent of this provi- 
sion was to prevent companies from using their pension funds to avoid tax 
liabilities rather than to provide for the retirement income of  their retirees. 
Legislation enacted in 1986 imposed a 10 percent tax on pension payments in 
excess of $1  12,000 per year. Again, the intent of the legislation was to prevent 
the use of tax preferences for what were believed to be excessive pension ben- 
efits. 
None of the pension legislation enacted in the 1980s was motivated by  the 
declining labor force participation rates, and very few of the pension regula- 
tions enacted are likely to have any significant effect on labor force participa- 
tion. In developing pension legislation in the  1980s, Congress attempted to 
promote fairness in pension coverage, to protect pension benefits for workers 
participating in pension plans, and to eliminate abuses in the tax advantages of 
pension programs. 
ffnresolved pension issues. Congress considered several other pension issues 
in the 1980s that were not fully resolved and that remain on the congressional 
10. Although the concept behind Section 89 was simple, the rules themselves were quite com- 
plex. Companies have complained about their complexity since they were enacted in 1986. The 
original effective date for compliance with Section 89 was 1 January 1989. The effective date was 
immediately postponed to 1 October and then to 1 December. Section 89 was repealed in 1989. 
11. The largest bankruptcies included Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. ($500 million in pension 
obligations) in 1985, Allis Chalmers Corp. ($170 million in obligations) also in 1985, and LTV 
Corp. ($2.2 billion in obligations) in 1986. 
12. Other retirement benefits were also addressed by  legislation in the 1980s. A 1988 law pro- 
tects the health and life insurance benefits of retired workers when their employer files for bank- 
ruptcy. Only a bankruptcy court could approve reductions  in benefits and, even then, only after 
negotiating in good faith with an employee representative. This legislation was motivated by  the 
loss of retirement benefits to steelworkers at LTV when the company filed for bankruptcy in 1986. 758  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
agenda. Even in these unresolved issues, there is very little concern about labor 
force participation or retirement incentives. One unresolved issue relates to 
pension portability. The motivation for legislation in this area is described in a 
report from the House Education and Labor Committee in 1988: 
Under current law, pension plan asset accumulations are increasingly being 
distributed at job termination and “cashed out” in the form of  lump sum 
distributions of employees’ entire pension plans interests. This is especially 
so in the case of defined contribution plans, although even defined benefit 
plans are increasingly taking on the form of cash accumulation accounts to 
be distributed upon termination of  employment. . . . Studies demonstrate 
that the vast majority of pension plan lump sum distributions are used for 
current consumption and that few employees reinvest such amounts for re- 
tirement in individual retirement accounts or annuities. 
The pension portability legislation proposed in  1988 would have allowed 
workers (or their employers) to transfer assets from an employer’s pension plan 
to a tax-exempt retirement account (an IRA, for example) without paying any 
early withdrawal fees or taxes on those assets. Under current law,  only the 
worker can make this transfer, and only the contributions made by the em- 
ployer (not the employee contributions) could be transferred. Pension portabil- 
ity legislation was reported from the House Education and Labor Committee 
in 1987 and 1988 but was not enacted. 
A second issue that received considerable attention in Congress in the 1980s 
relates to pension plan terminations and reversions. Congressional concern 
about the issue arose for several reasons. First, with the enormous rise in the 
stock market in the early 1980s, the value of  many pension fund portfolios 
became very large relative to the discounted future value of the funds’ future 
liabilities to retired employees. Many pension funds were significantly over- 
funded. Second, companies with overfunded plans were finding legal ways to 
remove excess assets from the pension funds to be used for nonpension pur- 
poses. Many in Congress were particularly concerned about the use of pension 
fund assets in corporate takeovers. In an increasing number of cases, the bid- 
ding company used the assets in the pension fund of  the target company to 
help finance the acquisition. Third, many companies were terminating their 
pension plans to gain access to the overfunded assets and were not replacing 
the terminated plans with new pension plans.” 
The frequency of  plan  terminations and  “reversions” of  the overfunded 
assets increased dramatically through the 1980~’~  The use of  pension fund 
13. Under current law, companies can withdraw pension assets only by terminating the pension 
plan. After a plan termination, both active and retired employees are entitled to the retirement 
income that they have already accrued under the plan, but there is no further accrual after the 
termination. While most companies also replace their terminated pension plan with a new pension 
plan, about 27 percent of companies who terminated plans in 1987 offered no new plan, and about 
one-third of companies who terminated plans in 1988 offered no new plan. 
14. Between  1980 and 1986, over 1,300 overfunded plans were terminated. These plans had 
provided pension benefits for over  1.6 million participants. Together, the terminated  plans had 759  Policy toward the Aged 
assets for nonpension purposes sparked a major political controversy over who 
owns (and who should own) these assets: the employers or the employee. 
Groups representing workers and retirees argued that the funds were the for 
the explicit purpose of providing retirement income for workers and that the 
workers should have at least part of  the surplus assets. Groups representing 
businesses argued that the funds belonged to the employer and that it would be 
inappropriate for Congress to dictate how those funds are dispensed. While the 
assets legally seem to belong to the employer, the sentiment in Congress about 
who should own the assets has been mixed. 
Congress came close to resolving the issue in 1987, with a compromise pro- 
posal to split surplus pension assets between workers, retirees, and the em- 
ployer. This proposed legislation was never enacted. Instead, Congress enacted 
a series of bills that have been considered temporary while the issue is studied 
more carefully. In 1986, Congress enacted a 10 percent excise tax on surplus 
assets removed from pension funds. Legislation enacted in  1987 prevented 
companies from making tax-exempt contributions to a pension fund if the fund 
were already valued at over 150 percent of current obligations. In  1988, the 
excise tax  on surplus assets removed from pension funds was raised to  15 
percent. 
Again, the concern in Congress was the provision and protection of  em- 
ployee benefits, not with the economic incentives associated with those ben- 
efits. 
Mandatory Retirement 
One area of legislation that impinged directly on retirement behavior was 
the increase in the mandatory retirement age from sixty-five to seventy enacted 
in 1978 and the complete prohibition of mandatory retirement enacted in 1986. 
Although both pieces of  legislation were intended to limit or prevent forced 
retirements, they were not motivated by a general concern with reduced labor 
force participation among older workers. Rather, they were intended to prevent 
the inequitable treatment of  older workers. President Reagan supported the 
legislation because he thought that older workers should not be forced to stop 
working when they reached a specified age. In enacting the legislation, how- 
ever, Congress addressed age discrimination more broadly, modifying the Age 
Discrimination Act to prevent any employer discrimination on the basis of age. 
Representative Claude Pepper (the oldest member of Congress) was a particu- 
larly strong advocate of the legislation. According to Pepper, “This legislation 
is an important step in guaranteeing the elderly of this nation a fundamental 
civil right-the  right to work as long as they are willing and able.” 
The legislation was strongly supported by senior citizen interest groups and 
opposed by  business groups, who argued that it would disrupt labor turnover 
pension fund assets of over $35 billion, of which about $20 billion was used for pension benefits 
and over $15 billion was taken by the companies for other purposes. 760  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
cycles, slow down the advancement of  qualified workers, and result in fewer 
jobs for younger people. While the elimination of mandatory retirement en- 
abled some workers to continue working past age seventy, the number of work- 
ers affected by this legislation is fairly small. Even when mandatory retirement 
was legal, few workers remained employed through age seventy, and only some 
of those working to age seventy were employed by firms with mandatory retire- 
ment p01icies.I~ 
In summary, retirement policy legislation concentrated almost entirely on 
the protection of benefits and issues that were considered matters of fairness. 
Incentives for early retirement received almost no attention. Thus, for example, 
mandatory retirement was eliminated, but little attention was given to pension 
plan provisions that encourage early retirement, Only in the revisions of Social 
Security did labor force participation incentives receive serious consideration, 
and this was only incidental to the principle motivation to return the Social 
Security trust fund to solvency. The loss in pension benefits from job mobility 
would appear to be an important economic issue and one that might be ex- 
pected to be the subject of congressional attention. The early retirement incen- 
tives of defined benefit pension plans might also have been the subject of legis- 
lative debate, although, in both cases, the appropriate legislative response is 
problematic, and possibly no strict regulation is best. 
12.1.3  The Result 
The reduction in the labor force participation of older workers and the trend 
toward earlier retirement has continued unabated for several decades, although 
it may have slowed in the late 1980s. The planned increase in the Social Secu- 
rity delayed retirement adjustment, the increase in the normal retirement age, 
and the reduction in the postretirement earnings tax rate might be expected to 
reduce the incentive to leave the labor force among workers who have not re- 
tired before age sixty-two. While new  Social Security policies may  induce 
some workers to continue working longer, the strong incentives that firm pen- 
sions provide for early retirement remain as they were. Indeed, firm pension 
plans typically provide incentive to retire much earlier than the normal retire- 
ment age for Social Security benefits (age sixty-five) and often earlier than 
Social Security’s early retirement (age sixty-two). Although some companies 
are beginning to reevaluate the early retirement incentives associated with their 
policies, legislation in the 1980s has not affected the basic economic incentives 
of most pension plans. 
15. In  1986, prior to the legislation, about 15.1 percent of people aged sixty-nine were in the 
labor force, and  10.6 percent of people aged seventy-one were in the labor force. (Thus, roughly 
4.5 percent of seventy-one-year-olds had retired between ages sixty-nine and  seventy-one-in- 
cluding both voluntary and mandatory retirements.) In  1989, with almost no employees subject to 
mandatory retirement, about 15.4 percent of people aged sixty-nine were in the labor force, and 
12.0 percent of people aged seventy-one were in the labor force. (Thus, roughly 3.4 percent of 
seventy-one-year-olds  had retired between ages sixty-nine and seventy-one-all  voluntarily.) 761  Policy toward the Aged 
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12.2  Personal Saving for Retirement 
12.2.1  The Economic Issue 
Personal saving in the United States has declined substantially as a fraction 
of  personal income since the early 1950s, and a large proportion of  families 
reach retirement age with little or no personal saving. Personal saving declined 
from between 3 and 6 percent of disposable private income in the 1950s to 
around 1 percent in the early 1980s, figures based on computations made by 
Summers and Carroll (1987) and reproduced in figure 12.5. These numbers 
are adjusted for inflation and exclude saving by  employers through defined 
benefit pension plans.  l6 Without the inflation adjustment, the downward trend 
begins only after 1973. 
Aggregate saving rates of  course reflect the wealth  accumulation of  all 
households, some of whom save very large amounts. Micro data show that a 
large fraction of families have almost no personal saving. On the basis of the 
recent Survey of  Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Venti and Wise 
(1991) have computed the composition of total wealth for all households, for 
homeowners, and for renters in  1984. The results are summarized in figure 
12.6. The amounts reflect median wealth by  asset category. It is clear from 
figure 12.6~  that most families approach retirement age with very little per- 
sonal saving other than housing equity. Among households with heads aged 
sixty to sixty-five, the median amount of liquid wealth is only $6,600; the me- 
dian value of housing equity is $43,000.’’ The majority of families rely heavily 
16. The national income accounts include firm contributions to defined benefit pension plans 
under “personal saving.” Inflation-adjusted saving is measured saving minus  the inflation rate (the 
GNP deflator) times net interest-bearing assets. 
17. Liquid wealth is broadly defined to include interest-eaming assets held in banks and other 
institutions, mortgages held, money owed from sale of businesses, US.  savings bonds, and check- 
ing accounts, equity in stocks, and mutual fund shares, less unsecured debt. Other wealth includes 
net equity in vehicles, business equity, and real estate equity (other than owned home). 762  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
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Fig. 12.6  (a)  Median wealth by age and asset category, all households; (b) 
Median wealth by age and asset category, homeowners; (c) Median wealth by 
age and asset category, renters 
on  Social Security benefits for support after retirement and to a much more 
limited extent on the saving that is done for them by employers through defined 
benefit pension plans. 
The Survey of  Income and Program Participation data allow estimation of 
the value of Social Security and pension plan benefits only after the payments 763  Policy toward the Aged 
are received.’* Thus, wealth in the form of  Social Security and pensions is 
recorded only for persons who have begun to receive the  payment^.'^ Most 
persons have retired by  sixty-five and thereafter are receiving the benefits to 
which they are entitled. About 59 percent of households with reference persons 
between sixty-five and seventy receive pension benefits; 89 percent receive 
Social Security benefits. The median of Social Security and pension wealth 
combined is $113,400 (the median of  Social Security wealth is $83,700 and 
the median  of  pension wealth $11,200); the median of  housing  wealth is 
$38,000, and the median of liquid financial assets is only $10,000.20 
In summary, the U.S. personal saving rate is currently the lowest of  any 
industrialized country and has declined substantially since the 1950s. A large 
proportion of  households have  almost no personal saving, even as they ap- 
proach retirement. 
12.2.2  The Legislation 
A series of legislative initiatives beginning in 1962 established and revised 
tax-advantaged saving programs. Initially, the legislative proposals were moti- 
vated by concerns for income security after retirement and for fairness in ac- 
cess to tax-advantaged saving programs. Later, legislation was motivated by 
the low observed national saving rates and by the tax cost of the programs at 
a time of large budget deficits. (These motivations of  course have opposite 
implications for whether these tax advantages should be limited or extended.) 
IRAs 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) were first established in  1974 as 
part of  the ERISA legislation. At that time, IRAs were limited to employees 
without firm pension plans and were intended to encourage these workers to 
save for retirement. IRAs were explicitly designed as a vehicle for retirement 
savings rather than savings more generally. The tax on the contribution and the 
interest were deferred until  money was  withdrawn from the account. Ac- 
cording to a report from the House Ways and Means Committee, “Since the 
objective of the new provision is to encourage adequate provision for retire- 
18. The SIPP data do not contain Social Security earnings histories (which determine Social 
Security benefits), nor do they contain detailed pension plan provisions. 
19. Social Security benefits are indexed to inflation; private pension benefits typically are not. 
The present  values of  pension  and Social  Security  are the discounted  and survival weighted 
streams of income from each source received by the reference person and the spouse if present. 
Discounting is at 6 percent, and survival probabilities are calculated from mortality tables by sex. 
Payments from Social Security, military pensions, federal employee pensions, and the railroad 
retirement pension are assumed to be indexed at an annual rate of 4 percent. All other sources of 
pension income are not indexed in the wealth calculations. 
20. The decline in Social Security and pension wealth with age is largely an artifact of declining 
life expectancy. The lower housing equity of older households is a cohort effect and does not 
reflect a reduction of housing equity as individual households age; in fact, housing equity increases 
on average as the elderly age; there is little change in housing equity even among families that 
move from one home to another. 764  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
ment needs, withdrawal of the retirement savings prior to age 591/2 will result 
in a penalty tax equal to  10 percent of  the amount of  the premature distri- 
bution.” 
The primary motivations for the legislation creating IRAs were to encourage 
income security after retirement and to impose greater equity in federal retire- 
ment policy. It was thought that workers without firm pension plans should 
have some of the tax advantages to prepare for retirement that workers received 
at companies with pension plans. This concern for fairness was expressed in 
the House Ways and Means Committee report recommending the passage of 
ERISA: “The committee believes that there is need on equity grounds to grant 
individuals who are not covered by any kind of qualified pension plan some of 
the tax advantages associated with such plans by providing them with a limited 
tax deduction for their retirement savings.” Keogh plans had been established 
much earlier (1962) and were motivated by  similar concerns about equity in 
retirement policy for the self-employed. 
The Economic Recovery Act of  1981 extended the availability of IRAs to 
all employees.21  Following the 198  1 legislation, any employee with earnings 
above $2,000 could contribute $2,000 to an IRA each year. An employed per- 
son with a nonworking spouse could contribute $2,250, while a married couple 
who were both working could contribute $2,000 each. The 1981 IRA legisla- 
tion was motivated in large part by the need to increase national saving as well 
as the desire to enhance the economic well-being of future retirees. The report 
of the Senate Finance Committee recommending passage of the bill states, 
The committee is concerned that the resources available to individuals who 
retire are often not adequate to avoid a substantial decrease from preretire- 
ment living standards. The committee believes that retirement savings by 
individuals can make an important contribution toward maintaining prere- 
tirement living standards and that the present level of individual savings is 
too often inadequate for this purpose. The committee understand that per- 
sonal savings of individuals have recently declined in relation to personal 
disposable income (i.e., personal income after personal tax payments). 
Over the next few years, IRAs became an immensely popular form of sav- 
ing. Annual contributions grew from about $5 billion in  1981 to about $35 
billion in 1984, accounting for about 20 percent of total personal saving. 
Initial plans for tax reform contemplated substantial increases in the IRA 
limit. The 1984 Treasury Plan (see U.S. Department of the Treasury 1984), for 
example, called for an increase in the IRA limit for an employed person from 
$2,000 to $2,500 and an increase in the limit for a nonworking spouse from 
$250 to $2,500. Thus, the contribution limit for a husband and a nonworking 
spouse would have increased from $2,250 to $5,000. A Modified Treasury Plan 
would have increased the limit for an employed person from $2,000 to $2,500, 
21. Indeed, even a self-employed person could have an IRA, but the contribution  would be 
counted against the Keogh limit. 765  Policy toward the Aged 
but the limit for a nonworking spouse would have increased to only $500. The 
so-called President’s Plan would have left the limit for an employed person at 
$2,000 but would have raised the spousal limit to $2,000 (see U.S. President 
1985). As tax reform legislation progressed through Congress, however, these 
proposals to expand IRAs were overshadowed by an alternative motivation- 
controlling the budget deficit. 
Most of the subsequent congressional debate on IRAs seemed to be condi- 
tioned in large part by the tax cost of IRAs and the large budget deficit, which 
had become a widespread concern. In addition, two claims about IRAs them- 
selves received considerable attention. The first was that IRAs were a benefit 
to the rich-that  IRA savings were held primarily by  wealthy people. The 
second was that IRAs produced no new saving. It was argued that funds were 
simply transferred from non-tax-advantaged savings accounts to IRA accounts 
or that IRA savings would have taken place anyway, even without the tax incen- 
tive. When this debate began, there was essentially no direct evidence on the 
saving effect of IRAs, yet Congress was exposed to pronouncements on both 
sides of the issue. The claims were based largely on personal anecdote and on 
the observation that aggregate personal saving had not increased. As shown 
above, the decline in personal savings (as measured by the national income 
accounts) that began in the early 1970s continued through the late 1980s. 
Despite the lack of  direct evidence, speculation on the savings effect of 
IRAs had a substantial effect on the legislation that was enacted. The first pro- 
posal put forth by the Senate Finance Committee was to eliminate entirely the 
IRA tax deduction. This proposal met with considerable public resistance. In 
the end, a compromise was reached that limited the IRA tax advantage for 
higher-income families who were covered by a firm pension plan. For persons 
with employer-provided pension plans, full tax-deductible IRA contributions 
were allowed only for individuals with income below $25,000 and couples 
with income below $40,000. Partial tax-deductible contributions would be al- 
lowed for individuals with incomes up to $35,000 and couples with incomes 
up to $50,000. No deduction was allowed for individuals with incomes above 
$35,000 and families with incomes above $50,000. However, the return on 
contributions continued to  accrue tax free. The contribution limits were not 
changed. In recommending legislation limiting tax-deductible IRA contribu- 
tions, the Senate Finance Committee made the following justification in its 
report to the full Senate: 
Since 1981, the expanded availability of IRAs has had no discernible impact 
on the level of  aggregate personal savings. In addition . . . the committee 
believes that the wide availability of  the option to make elective deferrals 
under cash or deferred arrangements [usually known as 401(k)s] and tax- 
sheltered annuities reduces the prior concern that individuals in employer- 
maintained plans should be able to save additional amounts for retirement 
on a discretionary basis. 
Further, data have  consistently shown that IRA utilization is quite low 766  David A. Wise and Richard G. Woodbury 
among lower-income taxpayers who may be the least likely to accumulate 
significant retirement saving in the absence of a specific tax provision. . . . 
The committee believes that those taxpayers for whom IRA utilization is the 
largest would generally have saved without regard to the tax incentives. 
More substantial evidence on the savings effects of IRAs and the wealth of 
those benefiting form IRA contributions was introduced during the debate and 
has been further developed since the 1986 legislation. New analysis of  IRA 
saving suggested that the net saving effect was substantial. In addition, it be- 
came clear that, although wealthier families were more likely to contribute to 
an IRA, the large majority of contributors were not wealthy.22  Although this 
new  evidence did  not  prevent  the  enactment  of  legislation limiting tax- 
deductible IRA contributions, it may have forestalled the much more extreme 
legislation first proposed by the Senate Finance Committee (to eliminate new 
IRA contributions altogether). 
Possibly fewer than 40 percent of  prior contributors were affected by  the 
1986 legislation, and, even for these families, only the up-front tax deduction 
was eliminated. Nevertheless, IRA contributions fell by  over 50 percent be- 
tween 1986 and 1987, the first year under the 1986 rules. Whereas over 15 
percent of tax filers made contributions in 1986, only 7 percent contributed in 
1987. The reporting of  the tax reform act and the less intense promotion by 
financial institutions apparently left the widespread impression that the IRA 
had been eliminated. Indeed, a 1988 survey showed that about half of all per- 
sons who were in fact still eligible to contribute to an IRA thought that they 
were not (IRA  Reportel; vol. 6, no. 9 [30 September 19881). 
Potential revisions of the IRA legislation have continued to be discussed to 
the present time. An ovemding consideration has continued to be the effect of 
any proposal on the budget deficit. But the extent to which IRAs increase the 
saving rate and the extent to which they present an advantage to a broad spec- 
trum of the population have been painted in different colors depending on the 
political circumstances. Whereas in 1986 the IRA was portrayed by some as a 
gift to the rich, in 1989 the IRA was put forth as a saving program that would 
increase saving and benefit individual savers over a broad spectrum of the pop- 
ulation. 
What had changed? In 1989, the administration was pressing for a capital 
gains tax reduction, arguing that at lower capital gains tax rate would increase 
national saving. The proposal to reduce capital gains taxes was being promoted 
at a time when the  1990 congressional budget resolution required a net in- 
creuse in tax revenues by at least $5 billion. Senator Bentsen (the Democratic 
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee), in part at least to defeat the capi- 
tal gains proposal, put forth an IRA proposal, appealing to the argument that 
the capital gains tax was a gift to the rich since only the wealthy owned stocks 
22. For example, initial drafts of papers by Venti  and Wise (1986, 1987) Wise  (1987),  and 
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and bonds. He argued that an expanded IRA would encourage more saving by 
the broad middle class rather than the rich. Indeed, the discussion revolved 
much more around who would gain from the savings incentive proposals rather 
than around what the effect of either would be on the economy overall. Who 
got the “tax break” was more important than aggregate saving and the potential 
benefit to the economy as a whole. 
Under Bentsen’s IRA proposal, those with incomes high enough to preclude 
a tax deduction for IRA  contributions under current law would be allowed to 
deduct 50 percent of their IRA contributions up to the current limits ($2,000 
for individuals, etc.). Both the capital gains proposal and the IRA proposal 
were politically popular, but it was unlikely that Congress could find enough 
additional revenues from other tax policy changes to pay  for both the IRA 
expansion and the capital gains tax reduction-thus  the opening to pit the IRA 
proposal against the capital gains tax reduction. Both could appeal to the need 
to increase the low rates of  national saving, but the capital gains reduction 
could be classed as helping the rich, while now the IRA proposal could be 
characterized as helping everyone. 
As the issue developed, Senator Roth introduced an alternative IRA pro- 
posal that became coupled with the proposal to reduce capital gains tax rates. 
Under Roth’s proposal, the tax incentives associated with IRAs would be sub- 
stantially altered, leading to increases in short-term tax revenue-and  thus en- 
abling the hoped-for cut in the capital gains tax-but  decreases in longer-term 
tax revenue. Roth’s plan would completely eliminate the tax deduction for IRA 
contributions (raising short-term tax revenue) but would allow both the princi- 
pal and the interest earnings to be withdrawn tax free in retirement (causing 
long-term revenue losses). In addition, the plan could be used to save for the 
purchase of a first home and for college expenses. A key motivation for this 
structure was to avoid the up-front tax cost of the program. Under this arrange- 
ment, the tax  cost would come later, when no tax would be levied on the 
IRA funds withdrawn. The inability of  Congress to reach a compromise on 
the interrelated issues of  capital gains tax rates and IRAs prevented legis- 
lation on either issue in 1989. In 1990 Bentsen reintroduced his IRA proposal, 
and the administration  proposed a “back-ended’’ savings plan, similar to Roth’s 
proposal in 1989. Although neither plan was enacted, legislation modifying 
IRAs continues to be evaluated. 
In  summary, the  initial (1974) IRA  legislation was  intended to impose 
greater equity in federal retirement policy and to encourage retirement income 
security for people without firm pensions. The 1981 legislation that expanded 
the availability of  IRA tax incentives was directly responsive to the low and 
declining national saving rate. The debate leading to the 1986 limitations on 
IRA contributions and the more recent discussion of other IRA revisions have 
been dominated by the tax cost of IRAs, the question of whether the benefits 
of IRAs devolve to the rich or to the poor, and the extent to which IRAs gener- 
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seemed to carry more weight than the potential effect on the economy at large 
through the saving effect. 
401(k)s 
These plans were formally established by  the Revenue Act of 1978 but were 
not used much until the 1981 clarifying rules. The plans, also known as cash 
and deferred arrangements (CODAS), permit employees to contribute before- 
tax dollars to qualified retirement plans. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of  1986, 
the annual 401(k) contribution limit was $30,000. The  1986 legislation re- 
duced the maximum employee contribution to $7,000 and also introduced non- 
discrimination provisions to prevent plans from providing benefits exclusively 
to high-income employees. Employer contributions (subject to nondiscrimina- 
tion rules) could still be as high as $30,000. Participants in 401(k) plans defer 
constructive realization of their contributions, thereby postponing their income 
tax liability. They also benefit from tax-free accumulation of the 401(k) invest- 
ment, just as with IRAs, and may also obtain additional benefits if the employer 
matches part of their 401(k) contribution.*’ 
As with Keogh plans (in  1962) and IRAs (in 1974), the 1978 legislation 
creating 401(k) plans was motivated by  a concern for equity in federal retire- 
ment policy. Prior to  1978, companies with cash or deferred profit-sharing 
plans were not assured tax-advantaged treatment for these plans if employees 
had the option of taking their compensation as cash or as deferred benefits. 
According to the Senate Finance Committee report dealing with 401(k) plans, 
“The committee believes that the uncertainty caused by the present state of the 
law has created the need for a permanent solution which permits employers to 
establish new cash or deferred arrangements.” 
As with IRAs, the budget deficit dominated the discussion by  1986. Surpris- 
ingly, the net saving effect of 401(k) plans received little attention, even though 
the 401(k) plans can be thought of much like IRAs and their effect on savings 
is likely to be substantial. The lack of attention to the savings effect of 401(k) 
plans may be explained by the relatively low utilization of 401(k)s at that time. 
Utilization has increased enormously since then. 
While the 1986 Tax Reform Act led to at least a temporary fall in IRA con- 
tributions, this has been partly offset by the rapid growth of 401(k) plan contri- 
butions. In  1983, total employment at firms with 401(k) plans totaled 7.1 mil- 
lion; by  1988, the number eligible to participate had increased to 27.5 million. 
The number of  employees choosing to participate in these plans also has in- 
creased sharply, from 4.5 million in  1983, to  10.3 million in  1985, to  15.7 
million in 1988. Most large firms now have 401(k) plans. A 1987 survey by 
Hewitt Associates, for example, found plans at 91 percent of the firms in the 
23. In the Massachusetts Mutual (1988) survey, 57 percent of  the firms offering 401(k) plans 
matched some fraction of an employee’s contribution. A 1988  GAO study (US.  General Account- 
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Fortune 200. More recent adoption of 401(k) plans has been fastest at small 
firms: the Massachusetts Mutual (1988) survey shows an increase in the num- 
ber of  small firms offering these plans from 8 percent in 1984 to 36 percent 
in 1988. 
For those eligible to participate in 401  (k) plans, participation rates are much 
higher than the rates in other saving plans, including IRAs. Tabulations from 
the March 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest a utilization rate of 
nearly 57 percent, up from 38 percent in 1983. In contrast, about 15 percent 
of tax filers contributed to an IRA account; possibly 25 percent of tax filers 
have IRA accounts. The average annual contribution to 401(k) plans in 1988 
was about $2,000. 
In summary, like Keogh plans and IRAs, 401(k) plans were introduced pri- 
marily to provide greater equity in federal retirement policy and to encourage 
retirement saving. The $30,000 limit allowed a great deal of tax-advantaged 
saving, and the possibility of employer matching made the plan more advanta- 
geous than IRAs. But, unlike IRAs, individuals could contribute only after a 
plan had been established by their employer. Thus, the participation rate was 
at first low but has been expanding rapidly. Again, like IRAs, the program was 
cut back just as 401(k)s were gaining in popularity. But, unlike IRAs, the 
401(k) limit is still high enough that only a small proportion  of participants 
contribute at the current $7,000 employee limit. 
12.2.3  The Result 
Despite the increasing availability of  tax-advantaged  savings programs in 
the early and mid-l980s, this period had among the lowest rate of personal 
saving in U.S. history This observation led many policymakers to conclude 
that tax-advantaged savings programs do little to increase savings behavior and 
thus had little positive social value. An increasing number of economic studies 
suggest just the opposite-retirement  savings programs  (such as IRAs and 
401[k]s) have induced a great deal of  savings that would not have occurred 
otherwise (see e.g., Venti and Wise 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991; and Feenburg and 
Skinner 1989). Indeed, savings rates would have been even lower in the 1980s 
without these programs. 
Even ignoring the savings effect of IRAs and 401(k)s, the short-term tax 
cost of these programs at a time of large budget deficits led Congress to limit 
these programs rather than extend them. The decisions to cut back 401 (k) con- 
tribution limits and IRA participation  were motivated largely by  the budget 
deficit. It seems, therefore, that the concerns about the budget deficit in the 
short run have taken precedence over long-run concerns for national  saving. 
Indeed the long-run tax cost associated with either of the tax-advantaged sav- 
ing programs is very small compared with the short-run tax costs that are moti- 
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12.3  Health Care 
12.3.1  The Economic Issue 
Health care costs have risen almost continuously as a proportion of  GNP 
since the early 196Os, as shown in figure 12.7. Total national health care expen- 
ditures claimed a full 11.1 percent of  GNP in 1987. Public expenditures on 
health care are rising, employer expenditures on health care are rising, and out- 
of-pocket consumer expenditures on health care are rising. 
The increases in national health care expenditures  have resulted from a num- 
ber of  factors, including the aging of  the population (and the higher health 
care utilization rates of older people), an increasing number of  health care 
procedures performed per patient, an increasing sophistication of health ser- 
vices for most illnesses, and high rates of inflation associated with health care 
services. Figure 12.8 shows the increase in medical care prices as compared 
with the increase in the general price level, as measured by  the consumer 
price index. 
The basic economic issue is how to provide health insurance while con- 
taining the expenditures  induced by the insurance-the  moral hazard problem. 
Because health care needs vary enormously across the population, and because 
these health care needs are typically unexpected, there is a natural role for 
health insurance. However, health insurance tends to increase the total use and 
cost of health care services. The greater use of  health care is drive by  both 
consumers of health care (who want to get healthy at the expense of insurers) 
and providers of health care (whose income depends on the provision of health 
care services). 
The moral hazard problem arises because the cost of health care to the indi- 
vidual is lower than the total cost of the care. When people decide how much 
to spend on health care, they base their decisions on their own personal costs 
rather than the costs to society. Once the cost is covered by insurance-either 
National Expenditures 
i 
Government Expendrtures,  _ _________-  -------  __ ________-__--  ------  .I  ___---_  -- 
1970  1972  1974  1976  1976  1980  1982  1984  1986  1968 
Year 
Fig. 12.7  National health care expenditures and government health care 
expenditures, as a percentage of GNP 771  Policy toward the Aged 
1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984 
Year 
Fig. 12.8  Consumer price index, medical care and all items, normalized to 1960 
through  the  government  or  through  private  insurance  programs-the  re- 
maining personal costs of health care are small, so there is little incentive for 
patients to limit the use of health care. The moral hazard incentive is even more 
acute with health care than with other forms of insurance because the providers 
of health care (not just the patients) have an enormous influence on the amount 
and the composition of health care demanded. Like patients, health care pro- 
viders have little incentive to economize on health care costs when they are 
fully reimbursed by health insurance. 
Both economic research and legislative activity have been directed to con- 
taining the moral hazard effects of health insurance. On the demand side, one 
way  to moderate the use of  health care services is through deductibles and 
copayments. Since the recipients of  health care services then pay at least part 
of  the cost of their care, there is a greater incentive for them to limit these 
expenditures, by  limiting either the extent of care of  its cost. On the supply 
side, the  use of  health care  services may  be moderated through fixed re- 
imbursement policies. If insurance companies (or the government) pay health 
care providers a fixed fee per patient (or per illness), then the providers will 
have a greater incentive to reduce the cost of care for their patients so that they 
can retain a larger share of that fee. Both the supply-side and the demand-side 
approaches are reflected in health care legislation in the 1980s. 
12.3.2  The Legislation 
The major themes of health care policy in the 1980s have been access, “cata- 
strophic’’ insurance, and cost control. Two major health care policies were en- 
acted by Congress. The first, in 1983, fundamentally changed the way the fed- 
eral  government  reimburses  hospitals  for  Medicare-covered services.  The 
second, in 1988, expanded Medicare coverage for “catastrophic” medical care 
expenses. Owing to public dissatisfaction with the financing of  catastrophic 
insurance, the new catastrophic coverage was almost totally repealed in 1989. 
These major legislative developments are discussed below. 772  David A. Wise and  Richard G. Woodbury 
Many other changes in health care policy were considered by  Congress in 
the 1980s, including national health insurance, public long-term care insur- 
ance, and mandatory employer-provided health insurance. Owing to the enor- 
mous cost of health care services, the significant strain on the federal govern- 
ment budget  throughout the  1980s, and opposition outside the government 
(from insurance companies, physicians, businesses, and others), none of these 
additional proposals has come close to gaining congressional approval. 
Medicare Reimbursement 
Controlling government expenditures on health care has been the single 
most important objective of health care legislation in the 1980s. Cost-control 
measures have been motivated by the large federal budget deficit, the escalat- 
ing public expenditures on health care services (through both the Medicare 
and the Medicaid programs), and the rapid acceleration of  health care costs 
generally. Cost-saving legislation was enacted almost every year throughout 
the  1980s, generally limiting the amount of  reimbursement provided by  the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs for hospital and physician services. 
The most significant legislation took place in 1983, when the Medicare re- 
imbursement procedure for hospital services underwent fundamental reform. 
Like Social Security reform (also in  1983), the reform of  the Medicare pro- 
gram was inspired by  a pending financial crisis. Medicare costs were rising 
rapidly, and the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund was projected to go bankrupt 
around 1987. 
While the final composition of Medicare reform was developed and enacted 
in  1983, the background for the legislation took place a year earlier, when 
Congress placed new limitations on the amount of hospital reimbursement un- 
der Medicare. Under the  1982 legislation, hospital reimbursement would be 
limited to 110 percent of the average per-case cost among similar hospitals. 
During a phase-in period, the limit would be placed at 120 percent in 1983, 
115 percent in 1984, and 110 percent thereafter. The 1982 legislation also lim- 
ited the annual increase in reimbursements to the increase in an index of hospi- 
tal wages and prices plus 1 percent. 
As expected, the health care industry was not at all satisfied with the new 
limitations, arguing that the reimbursement limits did not adequately account 
for the legitimate differences among hospitals. Because of  their dissatisfaction 
with the 1982 legislation, hospital officials were pleased to help develop and 
support the policy eventually implemented in  1983. In fact, anticipating that 
the 1982 limits would not be acceptable as a permanent hospital reimburse- 
ment policy, Congress had instructed the Department of  Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to develop an alternative proposal for a “prospective” payment 
system for hospital reimbursement. The Medicare reform enacted by Congress 
in 1983 followed the framework of the proposal submitted by HHS. 
Prior to the 1983 reform, Medicare reimbursements for health care services 
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cording to the costs incurred in providing health care services. Some believed 
that the cost-based Medicare reimbursement system was at least partially re- 
sponsible for rising health care costs because there was little economic incen- 
tive for health care providers to control costs. The 1983 reform directly ad- 
dressed this concern. The new reimbursement system provided a fixed fee for 
inpatient hospital services, regardless of the costs actually incurred in treat- 
ment. The amount of the fixed fee depended on the illness or the condition of 
the patient. Illnesses were categorized (and payments specified) for about 500 
“diagnosis-related groups,” or DRGs. The fixed DRG fees were intended to 
cover all hospital expenses in treating the illness or condition. 
The intended effect of the Medicare reform was to create incentives for hos- 
pitals to decrease their health care costs. Under the old system, hospitals were 
reimbursed more when they incurred higher costs-creating  an incentive for 
more extensive (and possibly excessive) treatments. Under the new reimburse- 
ment system, hospital payments were unrelated to costs. Any cost-saving mea- 
sures would directly benefit the hospital because there would be no reduction 
in the predetermined reimbursement from Medicare. 
Similar reimbursement limits have been placed  on physicians at various 
times throughout the 1980s. Most recently (1989), Congress developed a re- 
imbursement procedure based on a predetermined value of  physicians’ ser- 
vices.  Prior  to  the  1989 legislation,  Medicare  reimbursed  physicians  for 
Medicare-covered services on the basis of the physicians’ standard rates. Un- 
der the new system, physicians will be reimbursed according to a “resource- 
based relative value scale” (RBRVS). The RBRVS will specify a reimburse- 
ment rate for each type of  service provided and will be based on the time, 
training, skill, and overhead costs associated with providing each service. 
Both the  1983 reform of  hospital reimbursement and the  1989 reform of 
physician reimbursement account for at least some of the behavioral incentives 
emphasized in economic research on health care issues. Prior to these reforms, 
attempts to control health care costs focused on the recipient of care rather than 
on the provider. Medicare policies contained (and still contain) deductibles and 
copayments that make the recipients of care at least partially responsible for 
the expenses incurred by their health care decisions. Even in the means-tested 
Medicaid program, Congress enacted legislation in 1982 that allows states to 
collect small deductibles ($1  .OO or $2.00) from Medicaid patients so that the 
health care decisions of Medicaid patients are more cost conscious. 
Both the 1983 and the 1989 reforms focused on the providers of care. The 
1983 Medicare reform was intended to create cost-saving incentives for health 
care providers similar to the cost-saving incentives of patients when they face 
deductibles and copayments. Since profits under the DRG system are inversely 
related to costs, health care providers presumably would have a strong incen- 
tive to reduce costs. The 1989 Medicare reform was intended to control physi- 
cian  costs  by  imposing  more  control  on  their  reimbursement rates.  Both 
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though supply-side policies may be particularly effective because of the large 
role of  health care providers in determining the choice of care for their pa- 
tients  .24 
Catastrophic Health Insurance 
The second major development in health care policy in the 1980s was the 
enactment of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act in 1988 and its subse- 
quent repeal in 1989. Congressional consideration of “catastrophic” health in- 
surance was initiated by President Carter in the late 1970s and later by Presi- 
dent Reagan in both  his  1986 and his  1987 State of  the Union addresses. 
Responding to Reagan’s  1986 request, Secretary of  Health and Human Ser- 
vices Otis Bowen released a report in November 1986 outlining a catastrophic 
health insurance plan. Secretary Bowen’s initial proposal provided the basic 
framework for the legislation that was eventually enacted in 1988. 
Bowen had recommended that a $2,000 annual limit be established on all 
out-of-pocket expenditures for Medicare-covered health care services and that 
this coverage be financed through a modest increase in the Medicare Part B 
insurance premium. The legislation actually enacted placed an annual limit of 
about $564 (1989) on out-of-pocket expenditures for hospital care and an an- 
nual limit of about $1,370 (1989) on out-of-pocket expenditures for all Medi- 
care Part B services (including physician and other outpatient health care ser- 
vices). The limit would be increased each year so that 7 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries would be expected to reach the limit. The final legislation also 
expanded the number and duration of health care services covered by  Medi- 
care, including an increase in skilled nursing home care from 100 to 150 days, 
elimination of the 210-day limit on coverage for hospice care, the addition of 
coverage for thirty days of home health care, the addition of coverage for eighty 
hours of respite care, and the provision of 80 percent insurance for prescription 
drug costs above a $600 deductible. After the phase-in period, the new benefit 
would be financed primarily by  an increase in the monthly Part B premium 
from $24.80 to $35.00 and a supplemental premium imposed on all Medicare- 
covered individuals with an income tax liability above $150. Once phased in, 
the supplemental premium would be $42.00 for each $150 of annual income 
tax liability, up to a maximum premium of $1,050. About 60 percent of Medi: 
care beneficiaries would pay no supplemental premium. 
When the legislation was enacted in 1988, there was very little opposition 
to  the concept  of  catastrophic health  insurance (except among those  who 
thought that catastrophic insurance was better left to private medical insurance 
policies), although opinions varied on the most desirable content of the legisla- 
tion. The main lobbyists expressing an interest in catastrophic health insurance 
24. However, demand-side policies may also be quite effective. For example, some anecdotal 
evidence suggests that one of the reasons that internists are paid less than surgeons is that a much 
larger proportion of the fees of internists is paid by the patient for office services for which the 
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were the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), which supported 
the  legislation; the  National  Commission to  Preserve Social  Security and 
Medicare, which objected to the premium increases and the lack of coverage 
for long-term care services; and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa- 
tion (PMA), which opposed insurance for prescription drugs, worrying that 
insurance coverage would lead to price controls at a later date. When enacted 
in  1988, the Catastrophic Coverage Act was viewed by many as an excellent 
(landmark) change in public health policy. 
Opinions changed dramatically in  1989, when the effect of  the program’s 
financing became more apparent. First, Medicare recipients who were subject 
to the income-based supplemental premium argued that an income-based pre- 
mium was unfair. For the highest-income recipients, the supplemental pre- 
mium added $1,050 to their annual health insurance costs. Second, Medicare 
recipients began paying higher premiums before becoming eligible for any 
additional health care benefits. This was also considered unfair. Third, about 
3.3 million Medicare beneficiaries already received catastrophic insurance 
from  employer-provided post retirement medical benefits.  Under  the cata- 
strophic care legislation, these people faced higher Medicare premiums (espe- 
cially those subject to the supplemental premiums) with no additional health 
care benefits. Responding to the public dissatisfaction, Congress repealed the 
catastrophic care laws in 1989. 
National Health Insurance and Long-Term Care 
Some members of  Congress have expressed a strong interest in expanding 
health insurance coverage to include both more people and more health care 
services. In particular, there have been numerous legislative proposals for na- 
tional health insurance and for public long-term care insurance. Because of the 
enormous cost of these proposals, no comprehensive health and long-term care 
policy reform was enacted in the 1980s. 
Despite the cost, the financing of long-term health care is still widely consid- 
ered to be one of  the most important issues on the legislative agenda for the 
1990s. Nursing home care and other forms of long-term care are paid for al- 
most entirely by the recipient, until the recipient becomes eligible for means- 
tested Medicaid assistance. As a result, many older people are impoverished 
by long-term disabilities, and the financing of long-term care has developed as 
a major public concern. Several bills have been introduced in Congress that 
would provide at least some public insurance for long-term care services. Ow- 
ing to the enormous cost of  long-term care services, however, Congress has 
only initiated studies of long-term care needs and the financing of long-term 
care; it has not enacted any major long-term care legislation. 
Limited long-term care legislation has been enacted in several areas, how- 
ever. Congress enacted legislation in  1982 to provide Medicare coverage for 
hospice care (home health care and related services) to terminally ill patients. 
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legislation raised the maximum benefit to $6,500; 1984 legislation raised the 
daily hospice care rate from $46.25 to $53.17; and the 1988 catastrophic care 
legislation eliminated the 210-day limit on coverage. The catastrophic care leg- 
islation also expanded Medicare coverage to include up to thirty days of home 
health care and up to eight hours of respite care (professional health and custo- 
dial care services to relieve informal caregivers). While the provisions of  the 
catastrophic care legislation were repealed in 1989, those relating to long-term 
care are being evaluated again in 1990. 
One component of the catastrophic care legislation relates to the Medicaid 
rules limiting “spousal impoverishment.” Under previous Medicaid rules in 
most states, most of the income and assets of the married couple was used to 
determine Medicaid eligibility. As a result, both the institutionalized and the 
at-home spouse were often impoverished, before the institutionalized spouse 
became eligible for Medicaid assistance. Under the 1988 legislation, when one 
spouse enters a nursing home, the assets of the couple were to be divided be- 
tween them (with no less than $12,000 and no more than $60,000 attributed to 
the at-home spouse). Only the assets of the institutionalized spouse are consid- 
ered in determining Medicaid eligibility. In addition, the at-home spouse is 
entitled to a “maintenance needs allowance” from the income of both spouses. 
Once phased in in 1992, the maintenance needs allowance will be 150 percent 
of the federal poverty threshold for a two-person household up to $1,500 per 
month. 
While long-term care seems to be a higher priority in Congress, various 
forms of national health insurance have also been discussed periodically. Presi- 
dent Carter had been determined to enact a form of national health insurance 
during his presidency in the late 1970s. With the budgetary pressures of  the 
I980s, expectations about publicly provided national health insurance were 
replaced with the less ambitious catastrophic insurance proposals. An  alter- 
native approach to national health insurance received more attention later in 
the 1980s. This alternative would require all employers to provide health insur- 
ance for their employees.25  Senator Kennedy was a leading proponent of man- 
dated health benefits. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
(which Kennedy chairs) reported a bill in 1988, but no legislation was enacted. 
Opponents of  the  bill,  such  as  Senator Hatch,  argued  that  the  mandated 
benefits  would reduce jobs  and raise health care costs. The disagreement, 
where  conflicting “economic” analyses provided  the political ammunition, 
was  in  how  much  it would cost businesses and how  many jobs  would  be 
lost. 
25. Related legislation affecting employer-provided health insurance was enacted in 1982. Un- 
der this legislation, employers were required to provide the same health benefits for workers aged 
sixty-five to sixty-nine as were provided to younger employees. Medicare would pay only for the 
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12.3.3  The Result 
The objectives of health care legislation in the 1980s were to extend health 
insurance coverage and to control health care costs. Nonetheless, the 1980s 
have seen very  little change in coverage and continued growth in national 
health care expenditures. 
The Medicare reform enacted in 1983 was intended to create economic in- 
centives for hospitals to reduce costs. While the composition of  health care 
costs was affected by this legislation, total health care costs have continued to 
rise rapidly. The DRG system apparently led to a reduction in the average 
length of  stay of  hospital patients. Hospitals reduced costs by  reducing the 
length of stay, and this apparently led to a reduction in fees paid to physicians 
through hospitals. The reduction in direct hospital reimbursement, however, 
was largely offset by  an increase in outpatient physician fees paid through 
outpatient hospitals and offices. Total government expenditures on health care 
continue to increase, along with total national health care expenditures. 
Efforts to extend health insurance coverage have also been largely ineffec- 
tive. Proposals for national health insurance, public long-term care insurance, 
and employer-mandated health insurance were considered, but not enacted, in 
the 1980s. Catastrophic health insurance was enacted and then repealed. The 
distributional consequences of  these proposals appear to have been the most 
significant factors preventing legislation in this area. Catastrophic care failed 
because higher-income elderly would pay more; employer-mandated insurance 
failed because employers would pay more; national health insurance and long- 
term care insurance failed because certain taxpayers would need to pay more 
to support the extended coverage. In fact, since even the “uninsured” have ac- 
cess to charity care, proposals to “expand” health care coverage seem to have 
more to do with distribution (who pays for the care) than coverage (who gets 
the care). 
12.4  Conclusions and Discussion 
Aging  issues have  been  an  important  component  of  federal  legislation 
throughout the 1980s. The legislation enacted was influenced by and will have 
consequences for  economic  behavior,  income  distribution, and  “fairness.” 
While economic analysis is most useful in understanding the behavioral impli- 
cations of  government policies, distribution and fairness were more often the 
dominant factors influencing aging legislation in the 1980s. 
In some cases, such as Medicare reform, economic analysis has been central 
to the legislative debate on the issue. The intent of  the prospective payment 
system of Medicare reimbursement was to create economic incentives for hos- 
pitals to reduce the cost of health care. Most health economics research had 
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reimbursed providers of health care. The results of this research were applied 
extensively in developing the 1983 Medicare reform legislation. 
In other cases, economic analysis contributed extensively to the legislative 
debate but was not the central motivation for the legislation enacted. For ex- 
ample, Social Security reform was motivated by a projected financial shortage 
in the Social Security trust fund, and the legislation enacted was designed pri- 
marily to prevent this projected shortage. While not the central motivation for 
the reform, economic analysis was introduced and evaluated throughout the 
policy-making process, and the reforms enacted have important behavioral im- 
plications that were identified and evaluated through economic research. Some 
of the reforms enacted in 1983 decrease the work disincentives associated with 
prior Social Security policies and might be expected to defer retirement among 
workers not yet retired by age sixty-two. 
In still other cases, such as IRA legislation, economic analysis was sought 
and  considered, but its influence may  have  been diminished by  conflicting 
views among economists. In 1981, when IRA eligibility was extended, most 
policymakers seemed to believe that IRAs would be an effective vehicle for 
promoting retirement saving. When IRA eligibility was limited in 1986, many 
believed that IRAs were not an effective means of increasing personal saving. 
The debate leading up to the 1986 legislation and the more recent debate on 
expanding IRAs have had vociferous advocates of both economic conclusions 
about the effects of IRAs on savings. 
Finally, in some areas, such as private pension plan legislation, the issues 
addressed in Congress were outside the purview of central economic research. 
Changes in vesting rules, funding requirements, Social Security integration 
rules, pension insurance programs, survivorship benefits, nondiscrimination 
rules, and plan termination regulations were motivated by concerns about fair- 
ness or equity in the treatment of  different employees and protection of pen- 
sion benefits. Even the elimination of mandatory retirement was motivated by 
concerns about equity rather than the declining labor force participation of 
older workers. The work and retirement incentives associated with pension 
plans were rarely considered in the legislative debate, and they were scarcely 
affected by any of the 1980s pension legislation. 
In almost all instances, members of  Congress and their staff are exposed 
to a large amount of economic research before making any policy decisions. 
However, because almost no economic analysis is definitive, at least initially, 
the staff member must use individual judgment and intuition to evaluate this 
research. The more the conclusions of economic analysis differ, the greater the 
difficulty in making this evaluation, and the greater the role of intuition. 
Economic research considers both efficiency and distributional issues. But, 
ultimately, concerns about distribution and fairness are typically more signifi- 
cant in influencing the legislative outcomes than even the most conclusive of 
analyses of the potential efficiency effects of alternative policies. Nonetheless, 
economists’ warnings about the inefficiencies of potential policies and regula- 779  Policy toward the Aged 
tions may have warded off proposals that might otherwise have been enacted. 
And, in other cases-like  the DRG legislation-efficiency  arguments played 
a key role. 
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2.  Rudolph Penner 
Federal government payments to the elderly population make all other civilian 
budget issues pale in relative importance. Spending on people over sixty-five 
now absorbs almost half of  noninterest civilian spending, and the Congres- 
sional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that payments to the elderly will absorb 
some seventy cents of each additional dollar of noninterest civilian spending 
over the next five years. 
Figures 12.9 and 12.10 show how important the two main elderly programs, 
Social Security and Medicare, are in the budget. Over the long run, the relative 
importance of defense has declined relative to GNP, and interest has increased, 
as has Social Security and Medicare. Since the late 1970s, everything else has 
declined, which, I believe, indicates a significant ideological shift away from 
the view that prevailed in earlier decades. Figure 12.10 compares Social Secu- 
rity and Medicare and all other types of  civilian, noninterest spending and 
shows how rapidly Social Security and Medicare have grown, almost catching 
up to all other civilian noninterest spending in terms of importance. 
While Social Security and Medicare are overwhelming in their importance, 
the elderly receive a disproportionate share of other benefits as well. Medicaid 
is very rapidly becoming an elderly program because of soaring nursing home 
costs. There are special housing subsidies for the elderly, SSI exists mainly for 
the poor elderly, the elderly get a disproportionate share of  food stamps, and 
numerous nutrition programs are aimed at the elderly. In addition, civil service 
pensions and military pensions provide significant support to the elderly. 
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Currently, Social Security is the most costly program focused on the elderly, 
although current projections suggest that without radical reform, Medicare will 
exceed it in size in the early twenty-first century. The OASDI program consti- 
tutes about 21  percent of  total spending and about 34 percent of noninterest 
civilian spending. 
The ordinary citizen obviously must take a very long view of the Social 
Security system. It affects us through our working life because of a large pay- 
roll tax burden, and it affects our expected well-being while retired. Because 
it is to some degree a substitute for intergenerational transfers, it probably also 
has significant effects on private transfers from parents to children and from 
children to parents. Given that you have to take a long view, I am a little 
tempted to begin my story in the 1880s, rather than the 1980s. We did have a 
fairly substantial social security program in the nineteenth century, called Civil 
War pensions. By some magic, almost everybody qualified. The demise of eli- 
gible veterans was one of  many factors responsible for the establishment of 
Social Security. I have a feeling, however, that a three-hour history would not 
be much appreciated here. 
However, the policies of the 1980s were very much a reaction to the policy 
changes of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and I think that it is necessary to 
look at those in some detail. The peak year of Vietnam defense spending was 
1968, and defense spending continued to fall relative to GNP until the mid- 
1970s. About 70 percent of  the fall in defense from the peak to the trough 
was absorbed by increases in the Medicare and Social Security programs. The 
problem  was that  we made permanent long-run promises to the elderly  fi- 
nanced by a peace dividend that was, of course, temporary. 
Changes in the Social Security replacement rate for the single retiree illus- 
trate the growing generosity of the program. The average replacement rate is 
here defined as the benefit that a single person would get relative to his or her 
last year of income if the person earned the average wage for his or her whole 
working life. The replacement rate had eroded a bit in the early 1960s and was 782  Rudolph Penner 
about 31.4 percent in 1965, but it was quickly raised to 42.3 percent by  1975. 
That is a before-tax replacement rate, and the after-tax rate would be consider- 
ably higher. Also, someone retiring with a dependent spouse gets an extra 50 
percent. 
But more important than the benefit increases during this period was the 
adoption of indexing in 1972. It represented a profound change in the philoso- 
phy of the system because indexing changed the definition of the entitlement. 
The nation said, not only that retirees are entitled to a certain nominal benefit, 
but also that they are going to be protected against inflation as well. Further- 
more, the initial attempt to index was designed to go beyond CPI indexing and 
to provide a small real increase to each successive cohort of new retirees. In 
other words, the Congress tried to put the system on automatic pilot. Given the 
rates of inflation and real growth expected at the time, it was thought that the 
replacement rate would erode despite the small real increases expected with 
the new  indexing system, so that Congress would have had the opportunity 
from time to time to be generous and give people a more substantial real in- 
crease. 
The arithmetic of the indexing formula was faulty. When a surprising accel- 
eration in inflation occurred, the formula was such (and I certainly will not try 
to explain it here) that the real increase in benefits increased as the inflation 
rate increased. The replacement rate began to soar, eventually going over 50 
percent. 
Ironically, indexing was first passed as a money-saving measure. I remember 
believing that it would, in fact, control costs. In the late 1960s, the Congress 
had to adjust benefits upward periodically because of the Vietnam-related ac- 
celeration of inflation. Every time they opened up the issue, which they often 
did just before an election, there was enormous political pressure to provide 
increases in excess of inflation. Indexing was seen as a discipline. It was sup- 
posed to constrain real benefit increases, and the Congress hoped that it would 
allow them to ignore Social Security for long periods of time. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that the 1960s was a very un- 
usual decade. There was unusually rapid economic growth, and in the early 
1960s the elderly were among the poorest segment of the population.  A serious 
social problem existed, and the nation thought that it had sufficient resources 
to solve it because it was forecast that rapid growth would last forever. It was 
not surprising, in retrospect, to see intense political pressure to spend some of 
the anticipated growth dividend on the elderly. 
In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the needs were just as great, but the Con- 
gress did allow replacement rates to erode for long periods. I am very doubtful 
now that, in an unindexed system, the Congress would have compensated for 
the whole increase in the CPI in the late 1970s, when resources were more 
limited and real wages were eroding. Moreover, the CPI was upward biased 
during the period because of the flawed treatment of housing costs. 
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is to policy  decisions. With regard to Social Security, Martha Derthick has 
written brilliantly on how that program evolved, and her main theme is that a 
coterie of experts surrounds the system and has significant power over policy 
changes. The system is so intricate that very few people understand it, but there 
is a small group of people, such as Robert Ball and Robert Myers and various 
other former actuaries and commissioners, who understand it well and who are 
advocates for the system. They have enormous influence with the Ways  and 
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee because, in the 1970s, 
they were about tb.e  only people who understood the details of the system. So 
it was up to the technicians to develop an indexing system that replaced the 
flawed inflation indexing system that had been adopted in 1972, and I think that 
their choice was considered to be a technical matter, not a philosophical matter. 
Their choice, nevertheless, changed the philosophy of the entitlement once 
again because they invented a system that attempted evermore to keep the re- 
placement rate constant for newly retired persons at each segment of the in- 
come distribution. In other words, during people’s working life, they would 
accumulate an entitlement that allowed them to share in the rewards of eco- 
nomic growth. Oddly enough, the philosophy was schizoid in that, as soon as 
you retired, you were just guaranteed a constant real payment, and you did not 
share in real growth unless Congress explicitly acted to increase real benefits. 
I was working at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) at the time 
that indexing reform was being considered, and I truly felt that nobody knew 
what was going on. I could not believe the proposed legislation when I read it. 
It indexed the benefit formula to wages, not to prices. I tried to create a fuss and 
ran head-on into the intricacies of the system. It was extraordinarily difficult to 
explain what was going on to any policymakers. I vividly remember our effort 
to prepare the presentation of different indexing options to the cabinet and to 
President Ford, and we corralled some very bright defense analysts, thinking 
that  they  would be a good example of  the intelligent laymen that we were 
trying to convince and that we could explain the issues to them. We  tried, and 
they did not know what we were talking about. We reformulated the presenta- 
tion and tried it out on them again, and they seemed to understand it. But the 
next morning we asked them to explain it back, and none of them would have 
received 30  out of  100 on a test on it. I was not personally involved in the 
presentation to President Ford (I was at too low a level at the time), but some- 
how my name got associated with the presentation, and, when I saw him sev- 
eral months after the end of his presidency, he said, “Don’t try to explain double 
indexing to me again!” 
It was very hard to make people understand the importance of the issue. The 
histories of  policy developments (whether they be in Social Security or tax 
policy or whatever) are always written as though that is the only thing on the 
president’s mind during a particular period. If you read Derthick’s book about 
this indexing incident, it seems as though President Ford was considering little 
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economic summit meeting in Puerto Rico,  which he considered to be very 
important. I remember being frustrated because I saw the summit as a ceremo- 
nial occasion whereas the Social Security issue was worth hundreds of billions 
of dollars in present value terms. 
As an aside, you might not think that the choice of wage over price indexing 
cost much because of the slow subsequent growth in real wages, but the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) uses its own index. For reasons that I do not 
understand, real wages have grown much faster using the index the SSA uses 
for the purposes of adjustment than you would believe looking at the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) index for the average hourly wage. 
President Ford eventually recommended wage indexing to the Congress, but 
it was not enacted before he left the presidency. President Carter could not 
possibly recommend something less generous than President Ford, although 
there was some debate over the issue within his administration. 
Although the 1977 indexing reform was too generous in my view, the reform 
also took back a lot of the unintended increase in the replacement rate that had 
occurred under double indexing and that caused the famous problem of the 
notch baby. The new reforms were designed to put the Social Security system 
on automatic pilot, but all sorts of things went wrong. I have already mentioned 
some of them, including the upward bias in the CPI. But then the nation faced 
back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1982, and the system was on the verge of 
technical bankruptcy. 
The administration and the Congress set out to reform it once again, and 
the reformers faced a difficult task, given the difficult politics surrounding the 
system. The indexing prevented them from using inflation to erode benefits, 
and even real growth did not help because of the wage indexing of the benefit 
formula. So some of the entitlement had to be withdrawn, or else the taxes 
used to finance the system had to be increased significantly. Politicians dreaded 
that task, and, to shield themselves from blame, they appointed a commission 
led very skillfully by Alan Greenspan. I think that, if you talk to him, he will 
be very modest and say that he had a lot of good luck and that there were many 
times in the proceedings when it looked like the commission would fall apart. 
But, with the help of a subgroup of commission members from the Congress, 
they came forth with a major set of recommendations designed to finance the 
system for fifty years into the future. 
That commission has often been used as a model for how we might solve the 
fiscal crisis, and, indeed, that thinking brought forth the unfortunate National 
Economic Commission in the late 1980s. I think that one thing that people do 
not realize about the Social Security crisis of  1983, however, is that it was tiny 
quantitatively. If  you  spend a penny more than you earn every year, you will 
go bankrupt eventually, and that was the type of situation that the Social Secu- 
rity trust fund faced at the time. All the commission recommendations, and 
some things that the Congress added later, amounted only to about 2 percent 
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the gap, when the National Economic Commission was meeting, amounted to 
about 3 percent of  GNP, and now it is about 5 or 6 percent of GNP. Conse- 
quently, it is a much more serious problem quantitatively. The Greenspan Com- 
mission had a much easier task. But still, I give them great credit for coming 
up with a reform. Most of the reforms were directed at increasing the revenue 
of the system: payroll taxes were raised, civil servants and others were brought 
into the system for the first time, the benefits of the more affluent were taxed 
for the first time, and a cost-of-living (COLA) benefit increase was delayed. 
Some see the creation of the commission as a symptom of the lack of cour- 
age of politicians, but that ignores the fact that, when the commission’s  recom- 
mendations came to the Congress, the Congress went far beyond the commis- 
sion in one very important respect. They put the system on an actuarially sound 
basis for seventy-five years by extending the normal retirement age. That is to 
say, the age at which full benefits are paid will eventually reach sixty-seven. 
Under this new approach, people are still allowed to retire  as early as age 
sixty-two, but they suffer an actuarially appropriate reduction in their benefits 
relative to the full benefits at the new retirement age. This is a very clever way 
of achieving exactly what I was trying to achieve in the Ford administration by 
using CPI indexing rather than wage indexing. It implies a lower replacement 
rate at any specific age of retirement.  However, when I talk to laymen, not 
many people know that falling replacement rates are going to occur in the early 
twenty-first century, and, whether the reform will survive when people figure 
it out, I do not know. The replacement rate for a single person retiring at age 
sixty-five is now a little over 42 percent, while, under this scheme and the 
assumptions of the actuary, it would decline to 36 percent at age sixty-five by 
2030. During the debate on the retirement age, Senator Dole suggested, per- 
haps with tongue in cheek, that we should index the normal retirement age to 
life expectancy at age sixty-five. That might not be a bad idea. 
The reforms of  1983 focused on Social Security and largely ignored Medi- 
care. This came from focusing on the viability of the trust fund, and the Medi- 
care trust fund at that moment was not in terrible shape, although it was clear 
that it would go broke eventually. But we could have saved quite a bit of money 
in the future by increasing the eligibility age for Medicare to the new normal 
retirement age for Social Security. There was some debate about that, but I 
gather that people thought that that just might be too tough to swallow at the 
same time as Social Security was being made less generous. So the eligibility 
age for Medicare remains at age sixty-five. 
There is a continuing controversy over the so-called retirement test: the level 
of earnings at which you start to lose benefits. That has been made more lenient 
through time. There was also an important 1983 reform that increased the re- 
ward if you work past the normal retirement age. That increase in the reward 
will phase in very slowly and is not complete until 2007. The reform makes 
the retirement test less relevant. The reward for waiting for benefits is almost 
actuarially  fair. If  the retirement test was eliminated after 2007, some who 786  Rudolph Penner 
choose to work longer might nevertheless wait for higher benefits when they 
do choose to retire. 
Perhaps the most important policy event of  the  1980s-and  I am a little 
surprised that neither Charles Schultze nor David Stockman discussed this ear- 
lier with regard to budget policy-was  a law that failed to pass in 1985. At that 
time, under the very courageous leadership of  Senators Bob Dole and Peter 
Domenici, the Republicans in the Senate fashioned a major federal deficit re- 
duction package, which included as one of its components a COLA reduction 
for Social Security. A dramatic fight occurred in the Senate-the  Republican 
leadership managed to get a 49-49 tie vote by  carrying Pete Wilson in on a 
stretcher to vote for the package, and Vice President Bush broke the tie, voting 
for the package. President Reagan, having first backed the package, then turned 
against it as Republicans in the House fled from the proposal in the face of 
complaints from the elderly. Speaker Tip O’Neill was also violently against it. 
To me, that was a very important event. The proposed cut in Social Security 
was small, but in the subsequent campaign in 1986, wherever you  went, you 
saw Democratic candidates running ads that the Republicans were against So- 
cial Security, and many Republicans, rightly or wrongly, blame that episode 
for the loss of the Senate in that year. If the package had passed, pensioners 
would have hardly noticed the cut in benefits, but, ever since that time, Social 
Security has been far off the bargaining table. The clichC is that it is the third 
rail of politics: “Touch it and you die.” Even options as reasonable as taxing 
benefits as though they were private pensions are effectively off the table. 
Turning ‘to Medicare briefly, the new  payment  system for hospitals (the 
DRGs, or diagnosis-related groups) enacted in 1983 is very important. Over- 
simplifying somewhat, the reform took compensation for hospitals off a cost- 
plus basis and made it a fee for service. This changed incentives for the better 
and is saving a lot of money. There were many attempts in the 1980s to reduce 
payments to physicians by freezing their fees and doing other things, but they 
outgamed the system every time. Every time their fees were limited, they pre- 
scribed more procedures, so their income did not suffer. We  now have yet an- 
other attempt at reform that promulgates a detailed fee structure with some 
similarities to the DRG approach used for hospitals. Figures 12.9 and 12.10 
showed the growth of  Social Security and Medicare slowing somewhat re- 
cently, and I believe that that is partly related to some of the curbs on Medicare 
payments. But, even if  these reforms work in the long run, they obviously do 
not imply a fundamental change in the system. Once you stop cutting payments 
to providers, the system will just resume growing again at its former rate. And 
you cannot keep cutting providers year after year. 
In conclusion, I think that the elderly have gotten off very easily during the 
budget wars of the 1980s, given that they get almost half the civilian noninter- 
est budget. The record shows how extraordinarily difficult it is to deal with this 
powerful constituency. But there is only a very small chance of cutting the rate 
of  growth of civilian noninterest spending in the long run if  the nation does 787  Policy toward the Aged 
not renegotiate its social contract with the elderly. The problem gets very much 
more serious after 2005, when the baby boomers of the 1940s and 1950s begin 
to retire. We  are sure to return to the issue again and again. 
Summary of Discussion 
David Stockman explained the events surrounding the unsuccessful 1981 pro- 
posals for Social Security reform. He said that a package had been proposed 
in May  1981 that fleshed out $44 billion in unidentified savings in the original 
198  I budget. The plan was directed at structural reform of Social Security- 
it reduced the benefits received by early retirees and also removed a variety of 
“social policy add-ons” that had been instituted over time but did not qualify, 
in Stockman’s view, as earned retirement benefits. 
The plan was announced on 10 May. By 12 May it was being denounced by 
the Department of Health and Human Services as a White House plan, and by 
15 May  it was being advertised by  the White House as the Social Security 
Administration’s plan. On 20 May the Senate voted 93-0 against the plan, and 
that was the end of it. 
Martin Feldstein believed that it was the focus on early retirees that had 
killed the plan. Rather than reducing benefits by  2 or 3 percent for the entire 
population of retirees, the plan said that sixty-two- to sixty-five-year-olds  who 
were about to retire would face a 20 percent cut in benefits. 
William Niskanen argued that the May  1981 Social Security proposal was 
the major domestic policy mistake of the Reagan administration. He believed 
that the central lesson of the proposal’s failure was that short-term budget con- 
cerns often thwart more important structural reforms. 
To illustrate this point, Niskanen recalled the genesis of the 1981 proposal. 
Robert Myers would not entertain any changes in the basic structure of Social 
Security, but he had recommended a variety of changes in peripheral features 
of the program. In particular, he had proposed a reduction in the benefits for 
early retirees from 80 percent of  full retirement benefits to either 75 or 70 
percent. When an administration task force was considering this issue in the 
spring of  1981, Stockman had proposed a more drastic cut to only 55 percent 
of full retirement benefits, effective at the beginning of  1982. The task force 
had then divided into two groups, with one more concerned about early budget 
savings and the other more interested in long-term reform. Niskanen had been 
a member of the latter group, which revived the recommendations of the Hsiao 
report, recommendations that Penner had tried to implement during the Ford 
administration and that economist Henry Aaron had pushed during the Carter 
administration. The crucial recommendation was to index the “bend points” in 
the benefit formula to prices rather than wages; over time, this would transform 
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maintains real incomes. The replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to preretire- 
ment earnings) would drop gradually, without reducing the real benefits of any- 
one who is currently retired or near retirement. This approach reduces spend- 
ing by trillions of  dollars in present discounted value, but it produces almost 
no savings in the first year or even over a five-year budget horizon. Niskanen 
believed that the task force did not give this proposal sufficient consideration 
because of this lack of  short-run savings, but he stressed that the recommenda- 
tion remains the most politically realistic proposal for substantive reform. 
Stockman agreed with Niskanen’s description of  this debate, although he 
added that the administration’s  proposal had included some bend point reform. 
Stockman also argued that the Hsiao report made Social Security reform sound 
easier than it actually was. If  the bend points were in fact indexed to prices, 
there would be no real return on workers’ contributions to the program. Stock- 
man asserted, therefore, that something must be added to the indexing formula 
to proxy for the average real asset return over time. He agreed that the current 
approach of indexing benefits to wages or productivity is clearly excessive. 
Rudolph Penner noted that, even under the Hsiao report’s recommendations, 
Congress could increase benefits at any time in order to provide a real return 
on workers’ contributions. Penner had supported the Hsiao report, however, 
because he believed that such increases would be less generous than increases 
generated automatically from the growth in real wages. 
Feldstein added that indexing the bend points to prices would cause the en- 
tire system to shrink over time in real terms, encouraging people to put more 
money into private savings and pensions. 
Feldstein then shifted the discussion to the Social Security reforms of  1983. 
Those reforms entail future increases in the regular retirement age and thus 
represent a significant implicit reduction in benefits. The combination of de- 
layed retirement and the expected increase in life expectancy will mean a de- 
cline in the replacement rate for sixty-five-year-olds from 42 percent today to 
36 percent in 2012. Further, essentially all those benefits in 2012 will be taxed 
because the 1983 reforms also called for taxing all benefits above a quite high, 
but unindexed, threshold. 
Stockman contrasted the political design of the successful 1983 reforms with 
that of the failed 1981 reforms. The 1983 plan was officially sponsored by  a 
bipartisan commission led by  Alan Greenspan, but it really had been negoti- 
ated by  Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
Senator Bob Dole, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, and President Reagan. It 
was arranged that President Reagan and Tip O’Neill would make simultaneous 
announcements  endorsing  the  package,  thereby  eliminating  any  possible 
stigma or blame. This approach had worked perfectly, and it presented a bril- 
liant act of leadership in the face of a very large national problem. 
Stockman noted, however, that the reforms included only one short-term 
benefit change-a  six-month delay in the annual cost-of-living adjustment. In 
the year that this delay occurred, the inflation rate had fallen to only 3.8 per- 789  Policy toward the Aged 
cent, so the delay represented a 1.9 percent real reduction in benefits for the 
36 million people then receiving Social Security. Although their benefits re- 
mained permanently lower as a result, the delay had no impact on the benefits 
to be received by future retirees. If this delay had been implemented in 1980, 
on the other hand, when the inflation rate was 12.6 percent, there would have 
been a 6.3 percent real, permanent reduction in benefits. Stockman added that 
the decision to delay the cost-of-living adjustment had been made by the com- 
mission but had not been publicly announced until later; the precise mecha- 
nism for the delay was determined by Congress. 
James Tobirz wondered whether reductions in Social Security benefits would 
lead to equal reductions in payroll taxes or to reductions in the budget deficit 
instead. He believed that these two ways of thinking about the relation of Social 
Security to the rest of  the federal budget corresponded to two different views 
that one might have of  the role of the Social Security program. One view is 
that Social Security is a very large transfer program, involving both a large part 
of federal taxes and a large part of federal spending. From this perspective, for 
example, Moynihan is correct that the United States is using payroll taxes as a 
way of financing general government needs. The other view is that Social Se- 
curity is a retirement program, admittedly an “imperfect and awkward” one, in 
which one pays taxes in order to accumulate an entitlement to future benefits. 
If one thinks that workers are paying more into this plan than the benefits are 
worth to them, then one would reduce both benefits and taxes, and there would 
be no effect on the deficit. 
Feldstein responded that the big difference between a private pension plan 
and Social Security is that, until recently, the Social Security program was 
accumulating no assets. Thus, Social Security was reducing national saving 
by  substituting for the asset accumulation that otherwise would have occurred 
through private pensions or personal saving. The 1983 reforms were a partial 
response to this problem because they initiated the accumulation of surpluses 
in the Social Security trust fund. But he believed that the policy had been 
proposed in order to smooth the projected tax rate, not as a deliberate effort to 
raise national saving. Feldstein added that the system is still pay as you go over 
the next seventy-five years but involves a massive buildup of assets over current 
workers’ lifetimes. 
Penrzer said that he regarded Social Security as a transfer program, not a 
retirement program, because the redistribution goals of the system imply that 
the amount of taxes paid by  an individual has little relation to the amount of 
benefits received. For someone retiring today, the ratio of the present value of 
benefits to taxes is quite high, computed at a 2 percent real discount rate, but 
for most single people starting to work today, and for more affluent married 
couples, the present value of benefits is projected to be quite a bit less than the 
present value of taxes. Thus, Penner saw great merit in Moynihan’s proposal to 
cut the payroll tax and return to a more explicit pay-as-you-go system, but only 
if  other taxes were increased so that the deficit would not rise. But he recog- 790  Summary of Discussion 
nized that  such tax increases were a “political dream” in the current envi- 
ronment. 
Stockman added that the Social Security system involves enormous transfers 
between income classes as well as between generations. First, the benefit and 
contribution rules shift income from those who have higher lifetime earnings 
to those who have lower lifetime earnings. Second, and more important, the 
rules index everybody’s early earnings to the cumulative productivity growth 
in the economy over the following forty years. So the system is designed to 
capture the economic growth over time for every cohort of  retirees and to 
slightly shift income from the better off to the worse off. This is a public fiscal 
program, not a retirement program. 
Michael Mussa said that the total benefits being provided to retirees by cur- 
rent taxpayers had increased substantially over time as a share of  GNP. He 
thought that the critical question is, What is the expected present discounted 
value of the benefits that current retirees will receive from both Social Security 
and Medicare, as compared to the present discounted value of their contribu- 
tions to those programs? Although Penner discussed the Social Security re- 
placement rate for those currently retired, he did not compare the benefits from 
these programs to the benefits that those same contributions would have pur- 
chased in a private pension or health insurance plan. 
Penner thought that most people retiring in the early twenty-first century 
will earn roughly a market rate of return on their and their employers’ contribu- 
tions to Social Security. In contrast, the real return for all people retiring before 
the late 1980s is highly positive. Penner then returned to the replacement rate 
concept to capture the income redistribution element of Social Security. A re- 
tiree with average lifetime earnings faces a 42 percent replacement rate today, 
while someone who earned the Social Security maximum throughout his or 
her life faces roughly a 25 percent replacement rate, and someone who always 
earned the minimum wage faces a 57 percent rate. 
Feldstein returned to the rationale for the 1983 Social Security agreement. 
He asked to what extent the agreement had been viewed as a way of reducing 
the budget deficit by  increasing revenue through the Social Security system 
rather than through an explicit increase in general taxes. Also, to what extent 
had it been seen as a way of balancing benefits and taxes over the seventy-five 
years of the actuaries’ projections? And to what extent had it been viewed as 
a way to avoid big future tax increases because of a concern that future genera- 
tions of workers would not agree to those tax increases? 
Stockman said that the Greenspan Commission had been driven by two num- 
bers. One was the short-run solvency target, which had been $167 billion from 
1983 to 1990. The 1983 reforms dealt with this problem by accelerating taxes 
that were scheduled to take effect later anyway. Thus, the planned 1986 tax 
increase was moved to 1985, the 1990 increase to 1989, and there was a six- 
month delay in the cost-of-living adjustment. The other important number was 
the seventy-five-year projection of the trust fund balance, which estimated that 791  Policy toward the Aged 
benefits would exceed taxes by  1.9 percent of  payroll. Stockman said that 
people had not viewed the 1983 reforms as changing the Social Security sys- 
tem from a pay-as-you-go basis to a fully funded plan with an accumulation 
of capital. 
Charles  Schultze  pointed out, however, that Poterba’s paper quotes Tip 
O’Neill as saying that the reforms had fundamentally  changed the way that the 
system works. Schultze also explained two aspects of the Social Security bene- 
fit rules that had greatly distorted the system by  1983. First, the old measure 
of the CPI had overstated inflation by  roughly 10 percent between 1971 and 
1981. This overstatement led to permanently higher benefits for everyone who 
was retired at the time, although, as those people pass away, this issue will 
disappear. Second, and more systematically, the indexing formula for benefits 
guarantees the elderly an absolute standard of living after they retire. Thus, the 
elderly are unaffected by supply shocks that hurt the rest of the population. By 
1982, this indexing formula may have benefits by roughly 4 percent above the 
level based on more reasonable indexing. 
Geoffrey Carliner commented that the discussion had proceeded as if  the 
elderly were a special interest group, like farmers or the oil and gas industry, 
who had been able to win a generous support program from the government. 
But, during this period of Social Security expansion, there had been huge de- 
creases in poverty among the aged and widespread public support for the pro- 
gram. Carliner suggested that Social Security should be viewed not as a suc- 
cess story for a special interest group but rather as a program that is understood 
and liked by most people. 
Penner agreed that there is enormously strong and widespread support for 
Social Security. The public choice theory of special interest groups is based on 
the idea of concentrated benefits and diffused costs, where some small group 
receives a benefit whose cost is diffused throughout society and is so small 
that no one objects. The elderly do not fit this definition of a special interest 
because they are a large group and the cost of Social Security is very apparent 
in everyone’s  paycheck. Further, when one talks about reducing Social Security 
benefits, most of the complaints come not from the elderly but from their chil- 
dren, who are concerned that, if  the government pays less, they will have to 
pay more. And, when one suggests increasing the eligibility age for Medicaid 
along with the normal retirement age under Social Security, the complaints 
come from corporate benefit officers, who realize that they would have to pay 
more in medical benefits. 
Penner argued, however, that  some of the support for these programs is 
based on a misperception. A recent Los Angeles Times poll showed that a vast 
majority of  the public thinks of  the elderly as one of  the country’s neediest 
groups. But, when one looks at the income of the elderly and adjusts for house- 
hold size, it is clear that their income has grown faster than everyone else’s and 
has reached a higher average level. What this average obscures is that the 
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among the very old. So, when people think of the elderly, they tend to think of 
the very poor, although they are no more representative of the elderly than are 
the retired people playing golf in Palm Beach. 
Stockman said that, before any taxes or transfers are counted, 53 percent of 
the elderly have incomes below the poverty level. But, including taxes, cash 
transfers like Social Security, and in-kind transfers, only 4 percent of  the el- 
derly live below the poverty line. So the combined effect of  all government 
policies toward the aged is to take a population that is 50 percent poor and 
make it 4 percent poor. This role for the government is now built into the fabric 
of U.S. society, so the aged are not a special interest group, and these policies 
will never be fundamentally changed. 
Feldstein responded that people’s private income during retirement is not 
independent of the fact that they can count on Social Security. Stockman em- 
phasized that one cannot go back to 1935 and restart the world by telling every- 
body to do more private saving. 
David Wise asked about the political power of the elderly. Did the expansion 
of Social Security in the 1970s arise from that political power, or did it result 
from the peace dividend as the Vietnam War was ending? It was Wise’s impres- 
sion that the Social Security expansion was essentially unrelated to the increas- 
ing portion of the population that was old or to the lobbying of the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP). 
Penner admitted that payroll taxes had been increased to match the increase 
in benefits at the same time that the end of the Vietnam surtax was reducing 
income taxes. He was uncertain whether that huge increase in benefits and 
payroll taxes would have been possible without the peace dividend and accom- 
panying income tax cut. 
More generally, he believed that the elderly are extremely powerful politi- 
cally but that it would be impossible for them to capture such a large share of 
GNP without the strong support of  most of  the rest of the population. Polls 
suggest that even the youngest workers strongly support Social Security, even 
though some of  them do not believe that the program will exist when they 
retire. 
Feldstein added that, when he had gone to Washington as chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers, he had thought that he had arrived in Washing- 
ton  at the moment when Social Security benefits were likely to be cut. But, 
even when the Greenspan Commission was searching for ways to return the 
system to solvency, there were no votes for significant reductions in benefits. 
Wise said that it was natural that taking benefits away would be very hard, 
but he was still curious about the politics surrounding the increases in benefits 
in the 1970s. 
Stockman said that the political power of the elderly and of the AARP had 
developed in the 1980s out of a fear of Social Security benefit reductions. He 
did not think that the elderly had played a large role in the earlier expansion of 
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design more generally) had been the work of an unusually small priesthood of 
technicians. Prior to 1970, the Social Security actuaries had not included infla- 
tion in their work because people did not believe that inflation was a permanent 
part of the system. When inflation was first included in the seventy-five-year 
projections in the 1970s, the priesthood had made a number of decisions about 
bend points, indexing, and so on. One decision was to tie future benefits to the 
total growth of the economy, in the form of wage indexing of the bend points. 
When this rule became part of the expectations of the elderly population (with 
one correction of the technical error that caused double indexing in 1977), the 
elderly lobby was able to prevent the rule from being changed. But the elderly 
did not push the expansion through; the priesthood did. 
Charls Walker turned to the role of commissions in resolving difficult public 
policy problems. He believed that the success of the Greenspan Commission 
showed that well-constructed commissions are sometimes able to deal with 
issues that weak congressional leadership cannot. He argued that the inability 
of the National Economic Commission to resolve the budget deficit problem 
was due not to an inherent failing of  commissions but instead to particular 
circumstances at the time. When the tax issue arose during the presidential 
campaign, George Bush should have said that Congress had chosen a distin- 
guished group of  Americans to devise a solution and that he would listen to 
what they proposed before making up his mind. But when Bush said to “read 
his lips,” he had committed himself to a course of action that precluded accep- 
tance of the commission’s ideas. 
Feldstein returned to a central theme of the conference, namely, the role of 
economic analysis in the malung of economic policy. He argued that economic 
analysis had played almost no role in the macroeconomic aspects of  Social 
Security reform-determining  the appropriate buildup of the trust fund-ex- 
cept in the almost trivial sense of having enough money in the fund to pay the 
future bills. But on the microeconomic aspects of reform-the  retirement test 
on earnings and the delay in the retirement age-the  economic analysis about 
the extent to which Social Security distorts retirement decisions had apparently 
gotten  through  to  policymakers,  and  the  reforms  embodied  the  kinds  of 
changes for which economists had been pressing. 
Penner believed that the 1983 reforms that increased the reward for working 
beyond the normal retirement age had been motivated by  a strong sense of 
fairness as well as by the economic analysis of possible distortions to people’s 
retirement decisions. Penner found it hard to believe that the retirement test 
actually is very important to work effort because there is a strong trend toward 
early retirement anyway. He suspected, however, that many of the elderly who 
work do not report that fact to the government. 
Feldstein said that, when all the approved changes are fully phased in, they 
will eliminate any differential in the present value of benefits based on whether 
one retires early, at the regular age, or late. Wise added that, given the elimina- 
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tion would come from changing the early retirement age, not from changing 
the normal retirement age. 
Pad Joskow raised the issue of  Medicare. The introduction of  diagnostic 
related groups (DRGs) in 1983 seemed to be a good example of the use of 
economic analysis in policy-making. The idea had come from people who 
studied regulation, and it had been designed to promote fundamental changes 
in the health care system. The effects had not been as large as people would 
like, and they may not be as long lasting, but, as a consequence of the govern- 
ment buying medical care in a different and more sensible way, even private 
insurers have changed their approach to reimbursing health care providers. 
Joskow asked Penner whether policymakers at the time had perceived the in- 
troduction of DRGs as a significant event in terms of health care provisions and 
financing or whether it had been viewed as just a way of balancing the books? 
Penner responded that this had been a clear case of a policy analyst’s dream 
coming true. Even the strongest advocates of this reform, however, were very 
concerned that the system might find some way around the new rules, and that 
has yet to be proved one way or the other. But he had found the first reports of 
the effectiveness  of the reform very encouraging because it appeared that a lot 
of money had been saved without significantly lowering the quality of patient 
care. 